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Abstract
This Ph.D thesis focuses on two applied frameworks of stochastic con-
trolling and optimisation in financial economics. The first focus (Chapter
1) is on the convergence trading with testing cross-listed stock arbitrage.
The second (Chapter 2 to Chapter 4) is on the sequential studies of wealth
inequality.
In Chapter 1, the convergence trading is established by dynamic pro-
gramming, by setting objective at maximising trading utility function
with constraint characterising the mean-reversion between price spread.
Compared to past research that Liu and Timmermann (2013), the cointe-
grating vector has been inserted inside, meanwhile the volatility factor has
been split into multiple layers attributed by the relevant information sets.
A wide range of empirical tests have been conducted for the cross-listed
stock trading, including both in-the-sample and out-of-sample tests for
Eurozone, UK, US and China stock exchanges based on shares and CFD
trading. The testing result is convincing that stochastic optimal control
has the potentiality to amplify statistical arbitrages.
Chapter 2, initiates the research of wealth inequality. It first replicates
the consumption-saving framework proposed by Karatzas (1991) under
stochastic general equilibrium, by applying convex duality optimisation.
This is to study the influence from a household’s homogenous preference
of consumption on the dynamical evolutions of wealth and concentration.
Assuming that the household’s income is exogenously given and adopting
simulation. The simulation results suggest that consumption preference
has no significant impact on wealth inequality but on the volatility of
wealth inequality.
Chapter 3 simplifies the endogenous price density dependent on an agent’s
risk aversion. Meanwhile the standard (Pareto) optimal consumption is re-
modified by maximising the utility for both household’s consumption and
the expected saving the end of the dynasty, other than maximizing con-
sumption only. The simulation illustrates that although the homogenous
(heterogenous) risk aversion of a household’s consumption could affect the
progression of wealth concentration but it has no obvious association with
wealth inequality. Moreover the discreteness of heterogenous risk aversion
has no significant impact on wealth inequality throughout the dynastic
horizon, when each household’s income exogenously given.
Chapter 4 endogenizes the labour income and capital gain into the house-
hold revenue. Wage is endogenous from the technology progress (Total
Factor Productivity) of the industry. While capital gain is endogenous
from a completed competitive financial market with zero-profit condi-
tion for financial intermediates. Each household’s income is endogenously
driven by technology progress following the neoclassical economic growth
framework. At each development stage, the attributions of wage and capi-
tal gain follow contingent claim analysis and the consumptions satisfy the
Pareto optimal, inherited from the solution in Chapter 3 with convex du-
ality optimisation. Our structural model not only endogenously features
agent risk aversion but also the productive factor growth, human capital,
TFP and labor force, which further makes it possible the analysis of the
effects of all these factors on wealth inequality as a whole
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Chapter 1
Optimal convergence trading
1.1 Introduction to convergence trading
With the goal of maximizing investors’ terminal utility, we construct a non-threshold
based trading model within which the analytical solution of the optimal trading
weights for daily rebalancing has been derived via stochastic optimal controlling.
Having released the constraint that the cointegrating vector equals to one, we have
proposed a more practical trading strategy that is applicable to much wider range
categories of cointegrated assets. This paper is the first stochastic optimization paper
that carries on extensive out-the-sample experiments on the cross-listed stock portfo-
lios, which facilitates the comparative studies among Chinese and European, UK and
US stock markets. We further test the time-delay arbitrage of the cross-listed stocks
by employing two paralleled trading mechanisms, respectively equity-based contracts
for difference (CFD) and real shares trading. Our empirical results illustrate that
the time-delay arbitrage of the cross-listed stocks strategy based on the analytical
solution of weights yields relatively stable and better performance than that of the
home market index.
Convergence trading strategies have been applied for capturing arbitrage opportuni-
ties of the temporary anomalies between the relative-value of two assets. Which are
proposed to converge to the long-term equilibrium based on the historical repeating.
Follow the studies of Alexander (1999), Jurek and Yang (2007) and Liu and Tim-
mermann (2013) that the individual asset price is random walking although, some
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sorts of their combined price show the cointegration relationship. It implies the coin-
tegration error series (hereafter, relative-price discrepancies) between the asset pair
is stationary around the cointegration equilibrium proposed by Engle and Granger
(1987).
One of the simple pair trading strategy is arguably profitable based on the histori-
cal price dynamics and simple contrarian principles, tested by Gatev et al. (2006).
However, they assert the risk-adjusted returns of convergence trading will converge
to zero accompanying the stock market turns to be more and more efficient. Also,
these arbitrageurs may suffer big losses by the unforeseen permanent anomalies of the
price equilibrium, which is attributed by the significant changes of stock fundamen-
tals. Therefore, on the bilateral developed market, the simultaneous price arbitrage1
of cross-listed stocks attract the increasingly number of funds. It can effectively relief
the unforeseen permanent anomalies of the price equilibrium because of the law of one
price. Also, arbitrageurs profit from the short-lived price discrepancy attributed by
the information spill-over between markets, explained by Gagnon and Karolyi (2010).
However, the information spill-over has been shrunk accompanying the accelerating
evolution of the information technique. It keeps squeezing the available profitability
of the simultaneous price arbitrage of cross-listed stocks. On the contrary, intuitively
the information technique progress seemly cannot easily erase the relative-price dis-
crepancies between cross-listed stocks. Because the noisy trading activities during the
non-overlap time between bilateral markets cannot stop intuitively2. Therefore, it is
such worthy for this study to check whether the time-delay arbitrage of cross-listed
stocks is feasible or not by utilising stochastic optimal control. Probably it may be
one of feasible arbitrage patterns in the nearly strong efficient market.
1The simultaneous price arbitrage can be adopted in an easy way. Because numbers of large cap-
italized stocks express their quotation through American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and Global
Depositary Receipts (GDRs). Meanwhile the liquidity of the 24-hour over-the-counter (OTC) mar-
kets have being progressed to adequate for trading, liquidity risk to be less.
2In often there is no significant public information released beyond the working time of headquar-
ter of the cross-listed corporate in the home market. The discrepancy of the closing prices between
the home and foreign market is majorly attributed by the time-delay and noise information. The
closing prices of cross-listed stock pair may show (logarithm) cointegration relationship in the long-
run. Therefore, the stock price of home market in 24-hour Over-the-Counter (OTC) market usually
fluctuate around the last closing price until the next day morning auction.
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Despite that Griffin et al. (2010) show that the data-snooping is helpless to profit in
the emerging markets because of the volatile fundamentals. It is also worthy to check
whether the differential market microstructures and noise trading of the time-delay
between emerging markets (e.g. Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchange) can con-
tribute the profit for their cross-listed stock arbitrage.
Liu and Timmermann (2013) argue that the simple contrarian principles3 is failed
to exploit the short-term trade-off between risk and return in the consequential and
optimal way. Moreover, the equilibrium model shown by Kondor (2009) indicates
that the available profit tends to be eliminated by the intensive competition among
arbitrageurs. They rely on the simple contrarian thresholds, competitively seek to
position them at the largest price discrepancy point. However, most of them neglect
their current fleeting arbitrage opportunities. While this drawback can be released
by the analytical solution of trading weight in this paper. Because it can continu-
ally and dynamically advise investors to positions where required to be rebalance to,
throughout the whole trading horizon.
Without capital constraints, the relative-price arbitrageurs tend to be over aggressive
when the relative-price discrepancy diverge further and further, Grossman and Miller
(1988). In addition, the empirical evidence of He and Krishnamurthy (2011) shows
that the weak credit or liquidity may crash the financial positions of trade brokers.
Therefore, the common relative-price arbitrageur might be enforcedly wind up their
positions because of lacking spare capitals for margin call. Therefore, we involve the
risk aversion level in the exponential utility function to scale the capital constrain to
control the liquidity risk, similarly as the works of Tourin and Yan (2013) and Liu
and Timmermann (2013).
Comparing with the recent stochastic optimal convergence trading models such as
the studies of Mudchanatongsuk et al. (2008) and Liu and Timmermann (2013), we
extend the cointegrating vector of asset pairs from one to any figure. It theoretically
3One example of simple contrarian principles, is to position by setting 2 times standard deviations
of the relative-price discrepancy series. The fixed threshold leads the aggregated portfolio wealth
and trading weights piecewise changes.
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solids the stochastic optimal convergence trading is potentially suitable for a wide
range of asset categories (e.g. relative-price arbitrage between the paralleled stocks
under the same industrial index). Also it is the rare study related to time-delay
arbitrage of cross-listed stocks with abundant empirical analysis that covers major
developed and emerging stock markets. Both in-the-sample and out-the-sample tests
with their pivotal performance indicators have been presented.
The section 2.1 interprets and clarifies the assumption that stock volatility can be de-
composed to three components reflecting market, index (industrial) and firm-specific
information. The section 2.2 shows the stochastic differential equation on expressing
cointegrated asset dynamic with corresponding discrete form as well. The section
2.3 presents the analytical solution of daily trading weight which can be adopted on
the relative-price arbitrage. Section 3 carries on one complete empirical experiment
of the analytical solution obtained in 2.3 on the time-delay arbitrage of cross-listed
stocks. In specific, the section 3.1 express the wide range of portfolios with specific
stock selection criteria. The section 3.2 and 3.3 explain the feasible mechanisms of
real trading applications and the constrained capital utilization. At last but not least,
the section 3.4 shows each cross-listed stock portfolio performance of their time-delay
arbitrage by employing the analytical solution, also the key indicators can benchmark
index have been supplied.
1.2 Volatility Decomposition
According to Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) Fama (1970) stock return reflects
all available information related to the specific firm, index and market level. The
abnormal returns of stocks can be decomposed into systematic and idiosyncratic
components based on the CAPM augured by Sharpe (1964) and the five-factor asset
pricing model Fama and French (2017). The idiosyncratic component of volatility
is driven by the firm level information while market and index information steer the
4
systematic volatility component. Let us define
σ2s = β
2σ2sys + σ
2
idi (1.1)
where σ2sys is the systematic risk component and σ
2
idi is the idiosyncratic risk compo-
nent. Extending (1.1) to be
σ2s = (1− wx)σ2sys + wxσ2sys + (β2 − 1)σ2sys + σ2idi (1.2)
where (1 − wx)σ2sys is the stock return volatility component driven by market level
information, wxσ
2
sys is the volatility component driven by index level information, and
(β2−1)σ2sys and σ2idi are driven by firm level information. (β2−1)σ2sys and σ2idi can be
respectively treated as exogenous and endogenous volatility component correspond-
ing the firm level information. Specifically, (β2 − 1)σ2sys is the systematic volatility
component is transmitted to the firm level component based on the intrinsic charac-
teristics of the firm through the adapter coefficient β2 − 1.
It can be argued that the stock return volatility component driven by market level
information is heavily influenced by the current state and the expectations of the
macroeconomics factors of the economy, Engle and Rangel (2008) and Conrad and
Loch (2015). This argument is represented by factor (1−wx)σ2sys. On the other hand,
it has been shown the industry (index) level information also possesses sizeable power
on stock returns wxσ
2
sys, Roll (1988) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2004).
Let us assume a cross listed stock. The firm level information can be assumed to have
the similar effect to the stock volatility in the two markets. However, this cannot be
said for the other components. Regional cultures, the market participant charac-
teristics (e.g. the proportions of institutional and retailing investors) and structural
factors (e.g. currency fluctuation, ex-dividend-date and tax-induced heterogeneity)
differ between markets. Thus, the same news can derive differential magnitudes of
sentiment and volatility of stock returns Froot and Dabora (1999), Baker et al. (2012)
and Corredor et al. (2013). Additionally, there is information spillover (lead-lag ef-
fects) among the indices and the markets explained by Singh et al. (2010). In case
of different stocks that belong to the same index the same logic applies and there is
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also information spillover between these stocks King (1966), Ramnath (2002), Hou
(2007) and Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012).
Consequently, we assume that the observable stock price St assumed compositing
three components, S(t) = f(t) + in(t) + M(t). M(t) is the observable whole market
that stock price belonging to (e.g FTSE ALL Share Index), f(t) is the price part
purely reflecting the endogenous (unique) information of the firm fundamentals and
in(t) reflects the endogenous information derived by the fundamentals of each firm
in the index f(t) and in(t) are unobservable at time t. The cross-sectional informa-
tion transmitted from other firms under the identical index is excluded in f(t) but
involved in in(t). Similarly, the cross-sectional information transmitted from other
indexes under the same stock market is not contained in in(t) but in M(t). If define
IN(t) as the observable index price (e.g. FTSE100) then this can be decompose to
IN(t) = in(t) +M(t).
Based on the above exposition, each stock price can be presented as
dS(t)
S(t)
= µdt+ σfdZ1(t) + σindZ2(t) + σMdZ3(t) (1.3)
where µ is drift rate of price dynamics, σf and σin are the volatility factors related
to the endogenous information from the fundamentals of the specific firm and in-
dex respectively. σM is the volatility factor related to the composite information of
the whole market. σfdZ1(t), σindZ2(t) and σmdZ3(t) are the diffusion components
corresponding to the information set reflected by series f(t), in(t) and M(t) respec-
tively. They mutually determine the stochastic fluctuation of each stock return, the
cross-sectional information transmitted from other firms (indexes) under the identical
index (market) is excluded in f(t), (in(t)). In addition, the information of the specific
firm (index) spilling into the in(t), (M(t)) can be effectively diluted if there are many
stocks (indexes) paralleled under the same index (market), this convinces the three
diffusion components can be independent at least in a large volume market. Hence it
results Z1(t), Z2(t) and Z3(t) are independent Brownian motions.
Following (1.3) the information of the specific firm (index) transmitted to in(t), (M(t))
can be effectively diluted if there are large number of stocks (indexes) trading under
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the same index (market). Then σf and σin can be approximated as the
√
N fold
volatility of the change rates of the unobservable processes f(t) and in(t). They can
be estimated through formulas (1.4) and (1.5) (the formal proof see Apeendix)
σin =
√
N · | Var(RIN)− Var(RM) | (1.4)
σf =
√
N · | Var(RS)− Var(RIN) | (1.5)
where RS, RIN and RM are the price returns of the observable series S(t), In(t) and
M(t) and N is the length of the sample estimation. The diffusion terms σfdZ1(t),
σindZ2(t) at each continuous time point could switch between a positive and neg-
ative. If V ar(RS) < V ar(RIN) < V ar(RM) then these two diffusions expectation
are negative. This means that the intrinsic properties (endogenous information) of
the fundamentals of the specific firm and index weaken the volatility transmitted
from the market level. If V ar(RS) > V ar(RIN) > V ar(RM) then then the two
diffusions expectation are positive. In that scenario, the intrinsic properties of the
specific firm and index strengthen the volatility transmitted from the market level.
If V ar(RIN) > V ar(RM) and V ar(RIN) > V ar(RS), then the expectation diffusion
σfdZ1(t) in that specific period is negative but that of σindZ2(t) is positive. This im-
plies the intrinsic properties of the fundamentals of the index strengths the volatility
transmitted from the market (e.g. the performance of the Dow Jones U.S. Financials
Index during the 2008 financial crisis) while the endogenous information from the
firm fundamentals of the stabilize their fluctuation.
1.3 Optimal trading on mean-reverted spread
1.3.1 Mean-reverted spread
A stock pair is probably cointegrated when both stock absorbing the aligned informa-
tion from their similar fundamentals. The linear combination of cointegrated series
is a stationary process as described by Engle and Granger (1987). The logarithms of
7
stock prices A(t) and B(t) are cointegrated if they satisfy
x(t) = ln(A(t))−Q ln(B(t)) (1.6)
dx(t) = k(θ(t)− x(t))dt+ ηdW (t) (1.7)
x(t) is the cointegration error (relative price changing) while (1,−Q) is the cointegrat-
ing vector. The equation (1.7) ensures the spread x(t) as a stationary process, it keeps
fluctuating around the cointegrating equilibrium θ in the long-term horizon. The dis-
tance θ−x(t) is the equilibrium error correction term. θ(t)−x(t) > 0 (θ(t)−x(t) < 0)
implies the price-spread between asset A(t) and B(t) going to be larger (smaller). k
is the moving speed of price spread around the cointegration equilibrium, η is the
volatility factor and W (t) is a standard Brownian motion. The process (1.7) captures
the feature of mean reversion with stochastic fluctuations4
Rewriting (1.6) as
A(t) = ex(t)B(t)Q (1.8)
By applying Itoˆ formula on Eq.(1.8), it gives
dA(t) = ex(t)B(t)Qdx(t) +
1
2
ex(t)B(t)Q(dx(t))2 +Qex(t)B(t)Q−1dB(t)
1
2
Q(Q− 1)ex(t)B(t)Q−2(dB(t))2 +Qex(t)B(t)Q−1dx(t)dB(t)
(1.9)
Denoting the asset B satisfies expression in Eq.(1.3) as
dB(t)
B(t)
= µdt+ σfdZ1(t) + σindZ2(t) + σMdZ3(t) (1.10)
The fact that the cross-sectional information is being transmitted between stocks
(indexes) over the relevant index (market) is evidenced by Singh et al. (2010), King
(1966), Hou (2007) and Ramnath (2002). Assuming that the relative changing rate
of price (spread x(t)) can reflect the information transmission between cointegrated
4Alternatively, instead of the equation (1.3) the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross, the GARCH diffusion, Non-
Gaussian Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes can be similarly applied by Gregory et al. (2010). In this
study, we follow the classic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes to easily maintain the analytical tractabil-
ity.
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stocks over firm, index and market levels. The correlations between the diffusion
terms in the SDE (1.7) and every diffusion of SDE (1.10) are defined by
E(dZi(t)dW (t)) = ρidt, i = 1, 2, 3 (1.11)
In addition the relationship among volatility factors of the SDE (1.10) does satisfy
σ2B = σ
2
f + σ
2
in + σ
2
M (1.12)
By plugging (1.7), (1.10) and (1.12) into (1.9), it yields
dA(t)
A(t)
=
[
k(θ(t)− x(t)) +Qµ+ 1
2
η2 +
1
2
Q(Q− 1)σ2B
]
dt
+ηQ(σfρ1 + σinρ2 + σMρ3)dt+ ηdW (t)
+Q(σfdZ1(t) + σindZ2(t) + σMdZ3(t))
(1.13)
Suppose that the cointegration relationship between a stock pair is consistent with
the volatility decomposition (1.1) and (1.2) and stock B is the lead stock (host).
Each stock price change is incorporated on the fundamental information referred to
the specific firm, index and market levels. The volatility factors are related to the
endogenous fundamental information from the firm, index and market levels. Except
σ2B (the N fold of variance of the return rate of stock B) and ρi, the rest parameters
of the SDE (1.13) are linked from the process (1.3), (1.6) and (1.7). The lag stock
price A can be presented by (1.13) and their cointegration relationship with stock B.
If writing the relative price dynamics of stock A in a discrete format, it can benefit us
more obviously to see the relationship between stock pair based on their cointegration
relationship. Reordering (1.13) and plugging (1.7), (1.10) and (1.12) into (1.9), obtain
dA(t)
A(t)
= dx(t) +Q
dB(t)
B(t)
+Q(σfρ1 + σinρ2 + σMρ3)dt
+
1
2
η2dt+
1
2
Q(Q− 1)σ2Bdt
(1.14)
Following the maximized log-likelihood estimation, the estimator of η in the process
(1.7) can be given as
η =
√√√√ T∑
t=0
[(x(t+ 1)− x(t))− 1
T
k(θ − x(t))]2 (1.15)
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It can be approximated in further as
η =
√√√√ T∑
t=0
(x(t+ 1)− x(t))2 − 1√
T
k
(
θ − 1
T
T∑
t=0
x(t)
)
=
√√√√ T∑
t=0
T · Var(∆x(t))− 1√
T
k
(
θ − 1
T
T∑
t=0
x(t)
) (1.16)
In the long horizon T , x(t) fluctuates around its long-term equilibrium θ, it has
θ ≈ 1
T
T∑
t=0
x(t) (1.17)
Therefore, combining (1.16) and (1.17) yield us that
η ≈
√√√√ T∑
t=0
T · Var(∆x(t)), ∆x(t) ∼ 0 (1.18)
The volatility factor can be approximated as (see appendix)
σB ≈
√
N · Var(RiB(t)) (1.19)
σB can be estimated through a log likelihood estimator. However, the estimation will
lack accuracy (diffusion ambiguity). Based on the leading-lag effect the recent short-
term information can be transmitted between the cointegrated stocks and influence
their price. We can use the short-term process of return rate of stock B, RiB(t)
to estimate σB following (1.19). The subscript i stands for the most recent short
term with sampling length N . Recent data should provide computationally efficient
superior estimations on the volatility factor.
The estimation of η will be based on the long-term process ∆xj(t), subject to (1.18).
The subscript j denotes the long-term process with sampling length T . In addition,
the appendix shown that
σM =
√
T · Var(RM(t)) (1.20)
|σf | =
√
T · |Var(RS(t))− Var(RIN(t))| (1.21)
|σin| =
√
T · |Var(RIN(t))− Var(RM(t))| (1.22)
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Subject to (1.20), (1.21) and (1.22), it can be approximated that
ρ1σfη = Tρ1
√
Var(Rjf (t)) ·
√
Var(∆xj(t)) = T · Cov(Rjf (t),∆xj(t)) (1.23)
ρ2σinη = Tρ2
√
Var(Rjin(t)) ·
√
Var(∆xj(t)) = T · Cov(Rjin(t),∆xj(t)) (1.24)
ρ3σMη = Tρ3
√
Var(RjM(t)) ·
√
Var(∆xj(t)) = T · Cov(RjM(t),∆xj(t)) (1.25)
Overall, substituting (1.18)∼(1.25) into (1.14), the discrete form of changing rate of
stock A can be expressed by the return rate of stock B and the cointegration error,
RcA(t) = (∆x
c(t) +QRcB(t)) +
N
2
Q(Q− 1)Var(RiB(t)) +
T
2
Var(∆xj(t))
+QT
[
Cov(Rjf (t),∆x
j(t)) + Cov(Rjin(t),∆x
j(t)) + Cov(RjM(t),∆x
j(t))
]
j = 1, 2, 3 · · · c︸ ︷︷ ︸
T
i = t−N + 1, t−N + 2, t−N + 3 · · · c︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
, N  T
Cov(Rjf (t),∆x
j(t)) = ρ1
√
Var(∆Xj(t)) ·
√
| Var(RjB(t))− Var(RjIN)(t) |
Cov(Rjin(t),∆x
j(t)) = ρ2
√
Var(∆Xj(t)) ·
√
| Var(RjIN(t))− Var(RjM)(t) |
(1.26)
where RA(t), RB(t) and RM(t) are the observable return rates of the stock A, stock
B and the market index, that stock B belongs to. ∆x(t) is the changing rate of the
cointegration error where Rf (t) and Rin(t) are the return rates of the unobservable
processes f(t) and in(t), discussed in section (1.2). The subscript c denotes the cur-
rent step and j indicates the long-term process up to the current step c with sampling
length T . The subscript i indicates the short-term process up to current step with
sampling length N .
In (1.26), there are four components dominating the current-step return rate RcA(t).
The first one is ∆xc(t)+QRcB(t) implies that ∆x
c(t) and RcB(t) mutually synchronizes
RcA(t) in the current step. If considering the long-term case where E(∆xj(t)) ∼ 0,
then E(∆xj(t) + QRjB(t)) = QE(R
j
B(t)). That reveals RA is approximately Q times
of RB in the long run.
The second term Var(RiB(t)) is the short-term lead-lag factor. It implies the current
step return rate of stock A, RcA(t) is affected by the volatility of the latest N steps
return rate process of stock B, RiB(t). This is consistent with the price lead-lag effect
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mentioned by Hou (2007) that it takes a few steps for the endogenous information of
stock B to be transmitted to A and influencing its return rate.
The third term Var(∆xj(t)) is the long-term cointegration volatility factor. The co-
efficient T/2 illustrates the longer (more durable) is the cointegration relationship
between two stocks, the more influential will be the volatility of the long-term pro-
cess of the cointegration error (relative price) to the current-step return rate of stock
A.
The last component Cov(Rjf (t),∆x
j(t)) + Cov(Rjin(t),∆x
j(t)) + Cov(RjM(t),∆x
j(t))
is a long-term commovement factor, refeclting the long-term commovement between
Rjf (t), R
j
in(t) and R
j
M(t) with ∆x
j(t) affect the current step return RcA(t). This is
consistent to the empircal evidence provided by King (1966), Ramnath (2002) and
Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012). The long-term unique information of stock B (stock B
hosts these information) from the fundamentals of the firm, index and market level
strengthens the changes of relative price spread ∆xj(t). The greater Q reflects the
more significant influencing power.
1.3.2 Optimal trading weight
The pair trading is consistent to the self-financing, h(t) and −h(t) respectively refers
to the trading weight of stock A and B. The wealth dynamics of each trading pair
follows
dv(t)
v(t)
= h(t)
(
dA(t)
A(t)
− dB(t)
B(t)
)
(1.27)
By substituting (1.10) and (1.13) into (1.27), the wealth dynamic of trading pair is
specified as
dv(t)
v(t)
= h(t)
[
k(θ(t)− x(t)) + µ(Q− 1) + 1
2
η2 +
1
2
Q(Q− 1)σ2B
]
dt
+h(t)ηQ(σfρ1 + σinρ2 + σMρ3)dt+ h(t)ηdW (t)
+h(t)(Q− 1)(σfdZ1(t) + σindZ2(t) + σMdZ3(t))
(1.28)
In addition, the utility at the trading termination requires to be maximized
u(t, T ) = max
h(t)
Et
[
1
1− γV (T )
1−γ
]
(1.29)
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where γ denotes the coefficient of risk aversion.
Although the specific form of utility function is unknown at current position. It can
be treated as a continuous stochastic optimisation problem. In specific, denoting the
each current step as t and the forward step as τ . The spread x(t) and stock price A(t)
and B(t) reflect the whole available information adaptive to t, denoted as Ft. Due to
forthcoming information is unknown, we continuously target the utility of next step
achieving to the level that equals to the maximization of current step
u(τ) = max
h(t)
Et [u(t) | Ft] , t < τ t ∈ (0, T ) (1.30)
Investor’s utility u at each time point should be decided by the portfolio wealth v and
the spread price x, subject to Eq.(1.7) and (1.28) and following dynamic program-
ming, it contributes the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) that
∂u
∂t
+max
h
E{1
2
∂u
∂2v
ϕ3h
2v2 +
∂u
∂v∂x
ϕ1hv + [k(θ − x) + ϕ2]∂u
∂v
hv
+k(θ − x)∂u
∂x
+
1
2
∂u
∂2x
η2} = 0
ϕ1 = η
2 + (Q− 1)(σfρ1 + σinρ2 + σMρ3)η
ϕ2 = µ(Q− 1) + 1
2
η2 +
1
2
Q(Q− 1)σ2B +Q(σfρ1 + σinρ2 + σMρ3)η
ϕ3 = η
2 + (Q− 1)2σ2B + 2(Q− 1)(σfρ1 + σinρ2 + σMρ3)η
(1.31)
Taking the first-order condition on the HJB, obtain the initial solution of optimal
trading position of stock A
h∗ = −ϕ1
∂u
∂v∂x
+ [k(θ − x) + ϕ2]∂u∂v
vϕ3
∂u
∂2v
(1.32)
Plugging (1.32) back into the HJB
1
2
{
ϕ1
∂u
∂v∂x
+ [k(θ − x) + ϕ2]∂u
∂v
}2
− ϕ3[∂u
∂t
+ k(θ − x)∂u
∂x
+
1
2
∂u
∂2x
η2]
∂u
∂2v
= 0
(1.33)
The solution of ∂u
∂v∂x
, ∂u
∂v
and ∂u
∂2v
cannot be obtained directly from (1.33). Thus, as
similar as Korn and Kraft (2002), the separation of variables approach requires to be
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adopted.
Initially conjecturing
u(t, x, v) = v1−γξ(t)eα(t)x+β(t)x
2
(1.34)
where α(t), β(t) and ξ(t) are the separated variables which at termination α(T ) =
β(T ) = 0 and ξ(T ) = (1 − γ)−1, to recover the utility function to be identical as
(1.29).
Substituting (1.34) and corresponding derivatives ∂u
∂t
, ∂u
∂v
, ∂u
∂x
, ∂u
∂v∂x
, ∂u
∂2v
and ∂u
∂2x
into
(1.33), it gives
[ϕ3γ
∂β
∂t
+ 2ϕ21(1− γ)β2 − 2ϕ3γkβ + 2ϕ3γη2β2 − 2ϕ1(1− γ)kβ
+
1
2
(1− γ)k2]x2 + [ϕ3γ ∂α
∂t
+ 2ϕ21(1− γ)αβ − ϕ3γkα + 2ϕ3γη2αβ
+2ϕ1(1− γ)kθβ + 2ϕ3γkθβ + 2ϕ1ϕ2(1− γ)β − (1− γ)k2θ
−ϕ2(1− γ)k − ϕ1(1− γ)kα]x+ [1
2
(1− γ)(k2θ2 + ϕ22 + 2kϕ2θ)
+(1− γ)ϕ1αkθ + (1− γ)ϕ1ϕ2α + γ
ξ
ϕ3
∂ξ
∂t
+ ϕ3γkθα +
1
2
(1− γ)ϕ21α2
+γϕ3η
2β +
1
2
γϕ3η
2α2] = 0
(1.35)
Subjected to (1.35), the polynomial corresponding to the coefficient of x2 can be
re-arranged to be
∂β
∂t
+
2ϕ21(1− γ) + 2ϕ3γη2
ϕ3γ
(β − β+)(β − β−) = 0 (1.36)
it is an Riccati equation and β roots satisfy an quadratic equation
β2 − ϕ1(1− γ)k + ϕ3γk
ϕ21(1− γ) + ϕ3γη2
β +
(1− γ)2k
4ϕ21(1− γ) + 4ϕ3γη2
= 0 (1.37)
The roots can be generated by(
β+
β−
)
=
ϕ1(1− γ)k + ϕ3γk ±
√
ϕ3γ2(ϕ3 − 2ϕ1 + η2) + ϕ3γ(2ϕ1 − η2)
2ϕ21(1− γ) + 2ϕ3γη2
(1.38)
(1.36) can be rewritten to be
d ln | β − β+
β − β− | =
−2ϕ21(1− γ)− 2ϕ3γη2
ϕ3γ
(β+ − β−)dt (1.39)
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Integrating bothside of (1.39) and exsiting β(T ) = 0, it gives∫ T
0
d ln | β − β+
β − β− | =
∫ T
0
−2ϕ21(1− γ)− 2ϕ3γη2
ϕ3γ
(β+ − β−)dt (1.40)
ln | β − β+
β − β− | − ln |
β+
β−
| = 2ϕ
2
1(1− γ) + 2ϕ3γη2
ϕ3γ
(β+ − β−)(T − t) (1.41)
From (1.41), the expression of β(t) can obtained as
β(t) =
1− e
2ϕ21(1−γ)+2ϕ3γη2
ϕ3γ
(β+−β−)(T−t)
β−
β+
− e
2ϕ21(1−γ)+2ϕ3γη2
ϕ3γ
(β+−β−)(T−t)
β− (1.42)
By substituting β(t) roots, (1.38) into (1.42), β(t) is solved out as
β(t) =
k(a1 − a3)
a3
[1 +
2a2
a1 − a2 − (a1 + a2)e2a2a4k(T−t) ]
a1 = (1− γ)ϕ1 + γϕ3
a2 =
√
γ2ϕ3(ϕ3 − 2ϕ1 + η2) + γϕ3(2ϕ1 − η2)
a3 = 2(1− γ)ϕ21 + 2γϕ3η2
a4 =
γ
ϕ3
(1.43)
On another side of (1.35), the polynomial corresponding to the coefficient of x can be
re-arranged to be
γϕ3
∂α
∂t
+ b1α + b2 = 0
b1 = 2ϕ
2
1(1− γ)β + 2ϕ3γη2β − ϕ3γk − ϕ1(1− γ)k
b2 = [2ϕ3γkθ̂ + 2ϕ1(1− γ)kθ̂ + 2ϕ1ϕ2(1− γ)]β − ϕ2(1− γ)k − (1− γ)k2θ̂
(1.44)
rewritting (1.44) as
dα = (− b1
γϕ3
α− b1
γϕ3
)dt (1.45)
multiplying e
∫ t
0
b1
γϕ3
ds
both side, it gives
e
∫ t
0
b1
γϕ3
ds
dα = − b1
γϕ3
e
∫ t
0
b1
γϕ3
ds
αdt− e
∫ t
0
b1
γϕ3
ds b2
γϕ3
dt (1.46)
Thus,
de
∫ t
0
b1
γϕ3
ds
α = −e
∫ t
0
b1
γϕ3
ds b2
γϕ3
dt (1.47)
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integrating bothside of (1.47) from t to T
α(T )e
∫ T
0
b1(s)
γϕ3
ds − α(t)e
∫ t
0
b1(s)
γϕ3
ds
= −
∫ T
t
b2(τ)
γϕ3
e
∫ τ
0
b1(s)
γϕ3
ds
dτ (1.48)
Subjected to (1.48), recognizing α(T ) = 0, then it yields
α(t) =
∫ T
t
b2(τ)
γϕ3
e
∫ τ
t
b1(s)
γϕ3
ds
dτ, t < s < τ < T (1.49)
As α(t) and β(t) are solved out, Eq. (1.43) and (1.49), then subjected to (1.34), the
specific form of partial derivatives can given by
∂u
∂v∂x
= (1− γ)(α + 2βx)ξeαx+βx2v−γ (1.50)
∂u
∂v
= (1− γ)ξeαx+βx2v−γ (1.51)
∂u
∂2v
= −γ(1− γ)ξeαx+βx2v−γ−1 (1.52)
Finally, taking (1.50), (1.51) and (1.52) back into (1.32), the closed-form solution of
optimal trading weight of stock A is obtained
h∗(t) =
k(θ − x(t)) + (α(t) + 2β(t)x(t))ϕ1 + ϕ2
γϕ3
(1.53)
At current position, beyond the convergence speed k and error correction term θ−x(t),
other factors involving in the obtained solution h∗ still have no tangible economic
meaning, aim for this the discrete form is to attempt.
Plugging the specific form of ϕ1, ϕ2 and ϕ3 into (1.53), gives
h∗(t) =
(Q− 1)(σfρ1 + σinρ2 + σMρ3)η + η2
γ[2(Q− 1)σ1η + η2 + (Q− 1)2σ2s ]
(α + 2βx(t))
+
k(θ − x(t)) + 1
2
η2 + µ(Q− 1) + 1
2
Q(Q− 1)σ2B +Q(σfρ1 + σinρ2 + σMρ3)η
γ[2(Q− 1)σ1η + η2 + (Q− 1)2σ2s ]
(1.54)
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Substituting the equation substituting (1.18)∼(1.25) into (1.54), after arrangements,
the discrete expression of the optimal trading weight can be obtained
h∗(t) = {γ[Npi22Var(RiB(t)) + TVar(∆xj(t))
+2Tpi2(Cov(R
j
f (t),∆x
j(t)) + Cov(Rjin(t),∆x
j(t)) + Cov(RjM(t),∆x
j(t)))]}−1
·{k(θ − xc(t)) + Tpi1Var(∆xj(t)) + pi2µi +Npi3Var(RiB(t))
+Tpi4(Cov(R
j
f (t),∆x
j(t)) + Cov(Rjin(t),∆x
j(t)) + Cov(RjM(t),∆x
j(t)))}
pi1 =
1
2
+ α(t) + 2β(t)xc(t), pi2 = Q− 1
pi3 =
1
2
Q(Q− 1), pi4 = Q+ (Q− 1)(α(t) + 2β(t)xc(t))
(1.55)
(1.55) reveals the coefficient of risk aversion, γ, the long-term cointegration volatility
factor Var(∆xj(t)), the short-term trend of stock B return µi, the short-term lead-
lag factor Var(RiB(t)) and the long-term commovement factor Cov(R
j
f (t),∆x
j(t)) +
Cov(Rjin(t),∆x
j(t)) + Cov(RjM(t),∆x
j(t))) are determinants of the optimal trading
weight on stock A at each step. Although the price changing component attributed
by fundamental and industrial index level Rjf (t) and R
j
in(t) are unobservable, the
long-term commovement factors can be estimated via (1.26).
Usually in the cross market arbitrage trading, the cointegrating vector Q ∼ 1 then
(1.55) can be simplified to be
h∗(t) =
pi1
γ
+
1
γVar(∆xj(t))
[
k(θ − xc(t))
T
+ Cov(Rjf (t),∆x
j(t))
+Cov(Rjin(t),∆x
j(t)) + Cov(RjM(t),∆x
j(t)))]
(1.56)
Comparing (1.56) with (1.55), the short-term trend of return rate of stock B and the
short-term lead-lag factor no longer affect the optimal weight. This implies that cross
market trading pair converge every fast. Implicitly, the spill-over effect between in-
traday prices related to firm-level cross-sectional information almost disappears. Q is
approximately equal to one for the stock pair that have the unanimous fundamentals.
This is supported by the studies such as Alsayed and McGroarty (2012) referring to
cross-listed stocks in US. The literature also supports the firm-level cross-sectional
information of the host stock can be transmitted to the lag stock in an extremely
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short time when it comes to cross-listed stocks evidenced by Chen et al. (2009), they
suggest if the cross-listed stocks are observed with a delay above 30 minutes, then the
lead-lag effect is not statistically significant by Granger causality test. In addition
Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) estimate through panel-regression analysis to show the
daily-lead-lag coefficient is almost zero. Based on these studies, it is safe to assume
that for cross-listed stocks, setting Q = 1. Subject to (1.56) it is worth to note when
the cointegration relationship Var(∆xj(t)) is more volatile, the optimal weight will be
reduced. The similar condition will be taken place when investor is more risk averse
(the relative lower coefficient of risk aversion γ) or when the long-term commovement
factor between two stocks Cov(Rjin(t),∆x
j(t)) + Cov(RjM(t),∆x
j(t)) is decreasing.
1.4 Trading test data
In this section an empirical application of the previous methodology is presented. The
application is focused on cross-listed stock pairs between Eurozone vs. US, UK vs.
US and the Shanghai vs. Hong Kong Stock Exchanges. The host stock is named as
lead stock and the foreign listed stock is named lag stock. Three different portfolios
consisted by the cross-listed stocks (Eurozone-US, UK-US and China A-H share) will
be constructed and evaluated through the proposed methodology. The periods of
trading test under study are presented below in
Table 1.1: The first period of trading test
Cross-listed trading portfolio In-Sample Out-of-Sample
UK-US 14/07/2009-26/07/2011 27/07/2011-12/08/2013
Eurozone-US 14/07/2009-19/07/2011 20/07/2011-29/07/2013
China A-H share 13/07/2009-31/08/2011 01/09/2011-14/10/2013
Table 1.2: The second period of trading test
Cross-listed trading portfolio In-Sample Out-of-Sample
UK-US 27/07/2011-12/08/2013 13/08/2013-24/08/2015
Eurozone-US 20/07/2011-29/07/2013 30/07/2013-13/08/2015
China A-H share 01/09/2011-14/10/2013 15/10/2013-16/11/2015
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In each pair the same amount of capital will be dedicated. The selected cross-
listed stocks satisfy two main criteria. Their historical closing price data are available
for the examined period under study, their average daily trading volumes is greater
than 150000, to avoid the trading crash on prices attributed by this strategy (for the
historical trading volume of each stock during In-the-sample period, see the Appendix
C) . The second criteria is the log-price of each cross-listed stock pair are cointegrated
during the relevant in-sample periods, keep matched to process (1.6) and (1.7). The
cointegration test has been done through the Engle-Granger approach at 0.05 signif-
icant level.
Concerning the Eurozone-US portfolio, the lead stocks are listed on DAX, CAC40,
FTSE-MIB, AEX or ESTX50 stock indices and are denominated in Euros. The EU-
RONEXT 100 index will represent the Eurozone host market. The lag stocks are
listed either on NYSE or the NASDAQ stock indices and are traded through the
ADR denoted in US dollars. Concerning the UK-US portfolio, the UK stocks are
listed on FTSE 100, priced in GBP and the FTSE All-Share index represents the
host market. The US stocks are similar with the Eurozone - US portfolio. In the last
portfolio, the A shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 180 index (SSE180) is
the lead stock denominated in CNY while the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite
Index (SSE) represents the host market. Their lag stocks are traded in the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange and are priced in Hong Kong dollars, they are named as H
shares. The selected cross listed stocks that constructed by the three portfolios are
presented in the Table 1.3 ∼ 1.6
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Table 1.3: Cross-listed stock trading in Eurozone-US portfolio
Stock Name Ticker(lead) Ticker(lag)
AEGON AGN.AS AEG
Alcatel-lucent ALU.PA ALU
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA ABI.BR BUD
ArcelorMittal SA MT.AS MT
Eni SpA ENI.MI E
Fresenius Medical Care FME.DE FMS
Orange ORA.PA ORAN
RELX NV REN.AS RENX
Sanofi SAN.PA SNY
SAP SE SAP.DE SAP
STMicroelectronics NV STM.MI STM
Telecom Italia S.p.A TIT.MI TI
Tenaris S.A TEN.MI TS
TOTAL S.A FP.PA TOT
Unilever UNA.AS UN
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Table 1.4: Cross-listed stock trading in UK-US portfolio
Stock Name Ticker(lead) Ticker(lag)
ARM holdings plc ARM.L ARMH
AstraZeneca plc AZN.L AZN
Barclays plc BARC.L BCS
BHP Billiton plc BLT.L BBL
BP plc BP.L BP
British American Tobacco plc BATS.L BTI
BT Group plc BT-A.L BT
Carnival plc CCL.L CUK
Diageo plc DGE.L DEO
GlaxoSmithKline plc GSK.L GSK
HSBC Holding plc HSBA.L HSBC
InterContinental Hotels Group IHG.L IHG
Lloyds Banking Group plc LLOY.L LYG
National Grid plc NG.L NGG
Pearson plc PSON.L PSO
Prudential plc PRU.L PUK
Randgold Resources Ltd RRS.L GOLD
Rio Tinto plc RIO.L RIO
Royal Bank of Scotland Group RBS.L RBS
Royal Dutch Shell plc-A RDSA.L RDS-A
Royal Dutch Shell plc-B RDSB.L RDS-B
Shire plc SHP.L SHPG
Smith&Newphew plc SN.L SNN
Unilever plc ULVR.L UL
Vodafone Group plc VOD.L VOD
Table 1.5: Cross-listed stock trading in China A-H share portfolio
Stock Name Ticker(lead) Ticker(lag)
Air China Ltd 601111 0753
Aluminum of China Co Ltd 601600 2600
Anhui Conch Cement Co Ltd 600585 0914
Bank of China Ltd 601988 3988
Bank of Communication Co Ltd 601328 3328
China CITIC Bank Co Ltd 601998 0998
China Eastern Airlines Co Ltd 600115 0670
China Life Insurance Co Ltd 601628 2628
China Merchants Bank Co Ltd 600036 3968
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Table 1.6: Cross-listed stock trading in China A-H share portfolio
Stock Name Ticker(lead) Ticker(lag)
China Shenhua Energy Co Ltd 601088 1088
China Southern Airlines Co Ltd 600029 1055
Industrial&Commercial Bank of China 601398 1398
Tsingtao Brewery Co Ltd 600600 0168
Zijin Ming Group Co Ltd 601899 2899
In this trading application, the stock prices of the US and H shares have been
converted back to the currencies of their relevant host market based on the relevant
exchange rate. After converting the currency exchange rate, the lag stock price series
also need to be adjusted by the convert ratio. Convert Ratio shows how many shares
of the lag stock trade as a single share of the host stock during corresponding in-the-
sample trading period.
Table 1.7: Convert Ratio of trading stocks in Eurozone-US portfolio
Stock Name Convert Ratio(1st perriod) Convert Ratio(2nd period)
AEGON 0.98 0.98
Alcatel-lucent 1.04 1.04
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA 1.01 1.02
ArcelorMittal SA 0.95 0.97
Eni SpA 0.49 0.49
Fresenius Medical Care 1.96 1.96
Orange 0.98 0.98
RELX NV 0.90 0.94
Sanofi 2.00 1.99
SAP SE 1.01 0.99
STMicroelectronics NV 0.91 0.93
Telecom Italia S.p.A 0.10 0.10
Tenaris S.A 0.49 0.50
TOTAL S.A 0.97 0.97
Unilever 0.99 1.00
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Table 1.8: Convert Ratio of trading stocks in UK-US portfolio
Stock Name Convert Ratio(1st perriod) Convert Ratio(2nd period)
ARM holdings plc 32.89 33.12
AstraZeneca plc 196.43 198.7
Barclays plc 24.66 24.90
BHP Billiton plc 43.41 45.25
BP plc 16.27 16.40
British American Tobacco plc 50.10 50.12
BT Group plc 19.66 19.88
Carnival plc 96.17 98.29
Diageo plc 24.57 24.67
GlaxoSmithKline plc 50.04 50.42
HSBC Holding plc 18.87 19.50
InterContinental Hotels Group 104.58 104.69
Lloyds Banking Group plc 24.61 25.17
National Grid plc 19.38 19.86
Pearson plc 98.59 99.25
Prudential plc 49.49 49.71
Randgold Resources Ltd 98.18 98.61
Rio Tinto plc 95.23 95.68
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 48.89 49.90
Royal Dutch Shell plc-A 49.33 49.39
Royal Dutch Shell plc-B 48.56 49.26
Shire plc 33.20 33.21
Smith&Newphew plc 48.38 48.53
Unilever plc 98.47 99.34
Vodafone Group plc 10.46 10.26
Table 1.9: Convert Ratio of trading stocks in China A-H share portfolio
Stock Name Convert Ratio(1st perriod) Convert Ratio(2nd period)
Air China Ltd 1.68 1.24
Aluminum of China Co Ltd 1.84 2.08
Anhui Conch Cement Co Ltd 0.91 0.82
Bank of China Ltd 1.10 1.09
Bank of Communication Co Ltd 0.94 0.98
China CITIC Bank Co Ltd 1.26 1.21
China Eastern Airlines Co Ltd 2.25 1.62
China Life Insurance Co Ltd 0.85 1.00
China Merchants Bank Co Ltd 0.84 0.92
23
Table 1.10: Convert Ratio of trading stocks in China A-H share portfolio
Stock Name Convert Ratio(1st perriod) Convert Ratio(2nd period)
China Shenhua Energy Co Ltd 0.94 0.91
China Southern Airlines Co Ltd 2.48 1.42
Industrial&Commercial Bank 0.89 0.98
of China
Tsingtao Brewery Co Ltd 1.01 0.92
Zijin Ming Group Co Ltd 1.54 1.80
If regarding each portfolio as one two-year closed-end fund, then following the
proposed methodology section the trading horizon T is set as 504 trading days. The
trading weights of lead-lag stocks is suggested by the equation (1.53) and (1.56), the
inside parameter ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3 and pi1 are generated with (1.31) and (1.55), with detailed
parameter estimation in (1.20) ∼ (1.26) and the Appexdix B. The short-term window
N is 15 trading days and the long-term window T is 504 trading days, both of them
are sliding windows, with daily rolling frequency.
1.5 Trading application
The optimal trading weights are established on the self-financing assumption, namely,
the cross-listed stock pair should be kept equal weight with opposite positions through-
out whole trading. Majorly our strategy can be applied by either trading shares or
trading CFDs. In the comparison CFDs trading has a few advantages than trading
shares.
Firstly, CFDs trading has the relatively lower initial margin requirement rate (e.g.
5%), which benefits the capital utilisation is more efficient than that of share trading.
Secondly CFDs trading does not charge the stamp duty and levy (Financial Trans-
action Tax). This implies CFDs trading has the lower transaction cost than Share
trading. The Table 1.11 and Table 1.12 completely summaries the transaction cost
components charged5.
5The transaction cost is based on the open sources of Interactive Broker
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Table 1.11: Transaction costs summary for share trading (Basis points)
Market Commission Exchange fee Clearing Duties Algorithm fee Sum
US 50 0.30 0.02 0.002 - 50.32
Eurozone 8 0.16 - 10 - 18.16
UK 8 0.45 - 25 - 33.45
China A 8 0.70 6 10 - 24.70
China H 8 0.50 0.2 10.27 - 18.97
Table 1.12: Transaction costs summary for CFD trading (Basis points)
Market Commission Exchange fee Clearing Duties Algorithm fee Sum
US 10 - - - - 10
Eurozone 5 - - - 10 15
UK 5 - - - 15 20
China A 5 - - 10.27 10 25.27
China H 5 - - - 10 15
Based on the above tables it can be approximated that the transaction costs of
the relevant equity CFDs for the UK-US cross-listed pairs, Eurozone-US and China
A-H share is 15bps, 12.5bps and 20bps respectively. On the contrary, the transaction
costs of trading shares for these three portfolios is 42.5bps, 35bps and 22.5bps.
Thirdly CFDs trading is more flexible than shares because it is traded over the OTC
markets. In specific our strategy requires the cross-listed pair should be rebalanced
to the optimal trading weight at the end of each day theoretically. In addition, is
computed by using the closing prices of cross-listed pair. While it is unachievable in
the real trading. We cannot rebalance their weight simultaneously on both market
sides because the foreign stock market is closed delayed to the host market (e.g. Lon-
don Stock Exchange closing time is UTC 16:30 but New York Stock Exchange closes
at UTC 21:00).
In the real trading the above problem can be more easily solved by trading CFDs.
OTC markets offer major institutional investors the eligibility to trade equity CFDs
throughout 24 hours. Thus traders do not need to rebalance the CFD weight of the
lead stock at the host market closing time but need to rebalance the lag stock CFD
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weight at the closing time of foreign market in the first. After that, during the in-
terval time from the foreign market closing to the next day pre-market auction time
of the host market, traders required to gradually rebalance the weight of lead equity
CFD to the optimal position h∗ by executing the orders that emerging at the closing-
price of the lead stock. In specific, Major information can drive the significant price
movement are origin from the host market. In often the formal information are not
released beyond official working time of host market countries. This ensures the price
of lead stock CFD in the OTC market keeps fluctuating around the closing-price of
lead stock during the interval time between foreign market closing and the next day
pre-market auction time of the host market. Moreover, the stocks we selected are
blue-chip equity in the representative index (e.g. FTSE100), this guarantees their
trading liquidity of the equity CFDs in the OTC market is sufficient. Therefore,
above two premises can ensure institutional investors to execute the orders at the
closing-price of lead stock by 24-CFDs trading. On the other hand, this applying
strategy also can be achieved through the similar approach (24 hours OTC market)
with trading shares. But the less trading liquidity in trading share over OTC market
may attribute it is harder than trading equity CFDs.
The optimal weights h∗ is a closed-form solution with computing efficiency, it is feasi-
ble in applying on bar-frequency trading with synchronous prices between cross-listed
stock pair. However, for the simplicity we use the daily closing price in this test. More
importantly comparing with the synchronous price, the cointegration relationship be-
tween the closing prices of stock pair is the special point. Because this relationship is
leaded not only by the differential market regions (structures) but also leaded by the
time overlap. This section aims to check whether this trading application can profit
substantially or not, by utilising this special cointegration relationship of closing price
pair from the time overlap.
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1.6 Constrained Capital Utilisation
This application chooses to trade both shares and equity-based CFDs without lever-
aging. To the shares trading approach that we proposed to split the whole initial
endowment of each trading pair to be the equal half. Half is reserved for trading the
lead stock and another half for the lag stock. The optimal trading weight formula
(1.56) demonstrates that investor’s coefficient of risk aversion γ is one of crucial deter-
minants on the size of h∗. Therefore it is essential to locate one particular coefficient
of risk aversion γ∗, to guarantee the sum of maximized capital maintained in every
trading day from both sides, cannot exceed % of the capital owned by the investor,
throughout the whole trading horizon of the in-sample period. After that we carry
on using the γ∗ in the corresponding Out-the-Sample test.
In respect with trading equity CFDs, the 5% initial margin requirement rate allows
us can traded 20 times higher capitals than the capital owned. In addition, for sim-
plicity we do not consider risk managing issues by using adequately lower capital
for trading. Specifically, the maximized capital we allocated into the CFDs trading
account is lower than 15% of the capitals of each trading pair (7.5% for each side of
one pair). On the other hand, we reserved higher than 85% of total capital in case
the margin call problem. As similar as trading shares above, we rely on this trading
capital restriction to pick up the specific coefficient of risk aversion γ during the In-
the-Sample period, which should guarantee the capital used in CFDs trading cannot
be greater than 15% of the total capital owned. Thereby this γ∗ will be carried on in
the corresponding CFDs trading in Out-the-Sample test period.
The percentages of capital utilization throughout trading tests in all periods and
portfolio (CFDs&Shares) are presented below:
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Table 1.13: Capital utilizing rate of UK-US portfolio in the 1st period
CFDs Shares
Capital utilization In-Sample Out-of-Sample In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Mean 2.57% 2.41% 23.93% 21.57%
Std. 1.60% 1.18% 17.70% 14.56%
Maximum 11.11% 6.00% 85.76% 64.70%
Minimum 0.02% 0.03% 0.08% 0.14%
Table 1.14: Capital utilizing rate of UK-US portfolio in the 2nd period
CFDs Shares
Capital utilization In-Sample Out-of-Sample In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Mean 2.82% 3.14% 20.58% 22.16%
Std. 2.04% 1.35% 17.24% 13.14%
Maximum 11.03% 11.20% 82.89% 85.49%
Minimum 0.04% 0.08% 0.12% 0.30%
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(a) CFD trading (b) CFD trading
(c) Share trading (d) Share trading
Figure 1.1: Capital utilizing rate of UK-US portfolio in Out-of-Sample
Table 1.15: Capital utilizing rate of Eurozone-US portfolio in the 1st period
CFDs Shares
Capital utilization In-Sample Out-of-Sample In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Mean 3.16% 1.17% 23.07% 13.91%
Std. 1.80% 0.70% 15.60% 9.16%
Maximum 10.20% 3.40% 82.77% 41.80%
Minimum 0.03% 0.01% 0.09% 0.11%
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Table 1.16: Capital utilizing rate of Eurozone-US portfolio in the 2nd period
CFDs Shares
Capital utilization In-Sample Out-of-Sample In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Mean 3.04% 3.37% 23.11% 26.14%
Std. 1.72% 1.39% 16.63% 14.89%
Maximum 8.29% 6.69% 71.54% 61.77%
Minimum 0.04% 0.06% 0.15% 0.27%
(a) CFD trading (b) CFD trading
(c) Share trading (d) Share trading
Figure 1.2: Capital utilizing rate of Eurozone-US portfolio in Out-of-Sample
The Table 1.13 ∼ Table 1.16 and Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 illustrate throughout
the whole In-Sample and Out-of-Sample tradings, all the maximum capital percent-
ages of UK-US portfolio and Eurozone-US portfolio are lower than the 15% (CFDs
trading) and 100% (shares trading). That implies the portfolio diversification play
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the role in enhancing capital utilisation efficiency. In process of trading UK-US and
Eurozone-US portfolios with either CFDs or shares, the average trading capital per-
centage do not show the obvious difference between the In-sample and Out-of-Sample
period trading.
The capital percentage carried on tend to gradually shrink accompanying the time
to maturity. This benefits the Profit&Loss to reduce the influence from the decay of
mean-reversion of price spread. More specific this kind of convergence trading default
the cointegration relationship illustrated in the in-sample periods (the parameters are
estimated since In-Sample horizon with rolling window) can be continually maintained
in the corresponding Out-of-Sample periods. However, along the trading time pass-
ing in Out-of-Sample period, the older cointegration relationships are suffering the
erosions. Overall it can be suggested that the strategy stability is acceptable on the
viewpoint of portfolio trading capital for UK-US and Eurozone-US portfolio.
Table 1.17: Capital utilizing rate of China A-H share portfolio in the 1st period
CFDs Shares
Capital utilization In-Sample Out-of-Sample In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Mean 3.63% 7.12% 29.42% 60.96%
Std. 1.73% 1.90% 15.58% 19.78%
Maximum 11.03% 10.51% 92.96% 113.47%∗
Minimum 0.71% 1.61% 4.93% 11.41%
Table 1.18: Capital utilizing rate of China A-H share portfolio in the 2nd period
CFDs Shares
Capital utilization In-Sample Out-of-Sample In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Mean 3.55% 7.17% 27.52% 54.04%
Std. 1.61% 2.56% 14.70% 24.35%
Maximum 9.40% 11.85% 85.01% 102.35%∗
Minimum 0.89% 1.94% 5.62% 11.22%
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(a) CFD trading (b) CFD trading
(c) Share trading (d) Share trading
Figure 1.3: Capital utilizing rate of China A-H share portfolio in Out-of-Sample
The Table 1.17, Table 1.18 and Figure 1.3 show that in the China A-H portfolio,
their maximized utilization rate of capital of Share trading in the Out-of-Sample for
both two periods, exceed the 100% of total owned capital, nevertheless the specific
coefficient of risk aversion picked up γ∗ in the In-sample period can ensuring the
maximum capital required is lower than 100%. This implies during the share trading
of China A-H share portfolio, there a few trading days the strategy has to borrow up
to 13.47% and 2.35% over owned equity to maintain the position, it could be one ner-
vous of risk management. Comparing with share trading for applying this strategy,
the capital CFDs trading illustrates its stability, the capital utilization percentage in
both two Out-of-Sample are lower enough than 15%, that is the capital using celling
in CFDs trading. However it should be cautionary about both CFDs trading and
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shares, portfolio trading capital used during the out-sample periods are nearly twice
of that used in the in-sample periods. Therefore, it can be suggested that standing on
the angle of trading capital percentage, China A-H share portfolio requires the higher
capital requirement and the more skilled risk management technique than that re-
quired by the UK-US and European-US portfolios.
1.7 Trading Performance
Table 1.19: UK-US CFDs portfolio performance in the 1st period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 40.03% 25.03%
Annualized return 29.36% 14.74%
Volatility (ex.TC) 12.35% 4.09%
Volatility 12.19% 3.80%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 3.08 5.63
Sharpe ratio 2.24 3.35
Information ratio (ex.TC) 1.00 0.91
Information ratio 0.49 0.35
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 0.80% 0.47%
Maximum drawdown 0.95% 0.61%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 4 2
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 3 2
Annualized Transaction Cost 10.67% 10.29%
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Table 1.20: UK-US Shares portfolio performance in the 1st period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 15.08% 8.38%
Annualized return 4.58% -0.99%
Volatility (ex.TC) 5.03% 2.00%
Volatility 4.72% 1.86%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 2.60 3.18
Sharpe ratio 0.55 -1.61
Information ratio (ex.TC) -0.23 0.00
Information ratio -0.84 -0.53
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 0.50% 0.43%
Maximum drawdown 1.98% 4.13%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 4 3
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 3 2
Annualized Transaction Cost 10.50% 9.37%
Figure 1.4: Trading performance of UK-US portfolio in the 1st period
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Table 1.21: UK-US CFDs portfolio performance in the 2nd period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 47.23% 30.78%
Annualized return 30.19% 16.36%
Volatility (ex.TC) 7.29% 5.20%
Volatility 6.77% 4.74%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 6.20 5.54
Sharpe ratio 4.16 3.03
Information ratio (ex.TC) 2.03 2.68
Information ratio 1.16 1.56
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 0.75% 0.94%
Maximum drawdown 0.95% 1.04%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 2 3
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 2 2
Annualized Transaction Cost 17.04% 14.42%
Table 1.22: UK-US Shares portfolio performance in the 2nd period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 12.78% 7.29%
Annualized return -0.45% -2.72%
Volatility (ex.TC) 2.53% 1.58%
Volatility 2.24% 1.46%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 4.26 3.34
Sharpe ratio -1.09 -3.24
Information ratio (ex.TC) 0.28 0.88
Information ratio -0.47 0.05
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 0.43% 0.54%
Maximum drawdown 5.31% 5.57%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 3 3
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 2 2
Annualized Transaction Cost 13.23% 10.01%
35
Figure 1.5: Trading performance of UK-US portfolio in the 2nd period
Table 1.23: Eurozone-US CFDs portfolio performance in the 1st period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 57.09% 17.27%
Annualized return 37.72% 12.40%
Volatility (ex.TC) 5.99% 2.40%
Volatility 5.56% 2.22%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 9.20 6.36
Sharpe ratio 6.42 4.68
Information ratio (ex.TC) 2.23 0.46
Information ratio 1.25 0.24
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 0.49% 0.12%
Maximum drawdown 0.71% 0.14%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 3 2
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 2 2
Annualized Transaction Cost 19.37% 4.87%
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Table 1.24: Eurozone-US Shares portfolio performance in the 1st period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 13.06% 9.78%
Annualized return 0.45% 2.20%
Volatility (ex.TC) 2.00% 1.44%
Volatility 1.81% 1.19%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 5.52 5.40
Sharpe ratio -0.86 0.17
Information ratio (ex.TC) 0.00 0.12
Information ratio -0.65 -0.23
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 0.33% 0.09%
Maximum drawdown 1.85% 1.18%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 3 2
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 2 2
Annualized Transaction Cost 12.61% 7.58%
Figure 1.6: Trading performance of Eurozone-US portfolio in the 1st period
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Table 1.25: Eurozone-US CFDs portfolio performance in the 2nd period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 49.25% 25.75%
Annualized return 35.25% 15.14%
Volatility (ex.TC) 6.00% 3.10%
Volatility 5.64% 2.97%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 7.87 7.65
Sharpe ratio 5.89 4.42
Information ratio (ex.TC) 1.83 0.75
Information ratio 1.21 0.07
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 0.36% 0.47%
Maximum drawdown 0.46% 0.63%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 3 4
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 2 4
Annualized Transaction Cost 14.00% 10.61%
Table 1.26: Eurozone-US Shares portfolio performance in the 2nd period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 15.18% 6.76%
Annualized return 3.78% -0.91%
Volatility (ex.TC) 2.44% 1.18%
Volatility 2.16% 1.11%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 5.40 4.04
Sharpe ratio 0.82 -2.62
Information ratio (ex.TC) 0.33 -0.47
Information ratio -0.19 -0.97
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 0.21% 0.18%
Maximum drawdown 1.11% 2.32%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 2 4
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 2 5
Annualized Transaction Cost 11.40% 7.67%
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Figure 1.7: Trading performance of Eurozone-US portfolio in the 2nd period
Table 1.27: China A-H share CFDs portfolio performance in the 1st period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 34.64% 13.09%
Annualized return 27.09% 6.39%
Volatility (ex.TC) 7.04% 7.83%
Volatility 7.05% 7.78%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 4.35 1.16
Sharpe ratio 3.28 0.31
Information ratio (ex.TC) 1.60 0.94
Information ratio 1.31 0.59
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 2.49% 6.17%
Maximum drawdown 2.84% 7.43%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 11 20
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 10 35
Annualized Transaction Cost 7.56% 6.70%
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Table 1.28: China A-H share Shares portfolio performance in the 1st period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 14.45% 5.73%
Annualized return 10.72% 2.40%
Volatility (ex.TC) 3.20% 4.77%
Volatility 3.12% 4.65%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 3.27 0.36
Sharpe ratio 2.15 -0.35
Information ratio (ex.TC) 0.85 0.58
Information ratio 0.70 0.40
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 1.16% 3.66%
Maximum drawdown 1.33% 4.20%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 9 6
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 10 6
Annualized Transaction Cost 3.73% 3.33%
Figure 1.8: Trading performance of China A-H share portfolio in the 1st period
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Table 1.29: China A-H share CFDs portfolio performance in the 2nd period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 24.92% 15.16%
Annualized return 17.38% 8.17%
Volatility (ex.TC) 5.08% 8.22%
Volatility 4.99% 8.24%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 4.12 1.36
Sharpe ratio 2.68 0.51
Information ratio (ex.TC) 1.58 -0.41
Information ratio 1.18 -0.63
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 3.81% 9.91%
Maximum drawdown 4.36% 10.30%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 10 19
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 7 46
Annualized Transaction Cost 7.54% 6.99%
Table 1.30: China A-H share Shares portfolio performance in the 2nd period
Performance indicator In-Sample Out-of-Sample
Annualized return (ex.TC) 10.31% 6.48%
Annualized return 6.95% 3.48%
Volatility (ex.TC) 2.50% 3.05%
Volatility 2.44% 3.03%
Sharpe ratio (ex.TC) 2.53 0.81
Sharpe ratio 1.21 -0.17
Information ratio (ex.TC) 0.84 -0.73
Information ratio 0.66 -0.83
Maximum drawdown(ex.TC) 1.50% 3.04%
Maximum drawdown 1.71% 3.21%
Maximum drawdown duration (ex.TC) 8 23
Maximum drawdown recovery duration (ex.TC) 5 25
Annualized Transaction Cost 3.36% 3.00%
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Figure 1.9: Trading performance of China A-H share portfolio in the 2nd period
The trading performances of each cross-listed trading portfolio and period including
(excluding) transaction cost (TC) are given by the Table 1.19 ∼ Table 1.30 and the
Figure 1.4 ∼ Figure 1.9. CFDs trading with our strategy for UK-US, Eurozone-US
and China A-H share portfolio all possess earning ability throughout out-samples of
both two periods. It roughly spends 13.91%-26.14% of total capital to maintain the
CFDs trading for UK-US and European-US portfolios, which are much lower than
that spent by China A-H share from 54.04% to 60.9% of the total capital. Nev-
ertheless, the following table shows that during the out-sample periods the CFDs
trading of UK-US and Eurozone-US portfolios yield them the annualized profits from
the 12.40% to 16.36% (incl. TC). Those are approximately twice higher than the
CFDs trading profitability 6.39% to 8.17% (incl. TC) for China A-H share portfolio.
Therefore, it can be argued the CFDs trading of UK-US or Eurozone-US portfolios
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have the much higher capital utilisation efficiency than that of China A share-H share
portfolio to obtain the equal profits.
Without considering transaction cost, the shares trading of the whole portfolios has
the earning abilities namely annualized return from 5.73% to 9.78% (ex.TC) in the
out-sample trading periods. However, three out of the four return rates after deduct-
ing the transaction costs for both UK-US and Eurozone-US portfolios show the losses
-0.99%, -2.72% and -0.91%. The above result indirectly demonstrates the transaction
costs charged in share trading of UK-US and Eurozone-US portfolio are higher than
that of China share portfolio. Their profits have been offset to be the loss because of
the higher transaction cost. Moreover, the annualized transaction cost figures of share
trading directly show UK-US and Eurozone-US portfolio spend around 7.58%-10.01%
of total capitals to pay the transaction cost. On the contrary China A-H share just
pay 3.00%-3.33% of total capitals as transaction cost. Overall we proposed it is better
to adopt CFDs trading for UK-US and Eurozone-US portfolios in the real trading.
The riskless interest rate is assumed as 2% (2% is higher than the whole historical
12 month-LIBOR rate in the past 6 years) and 4% (4% is higher than the whole his-
torical 12month-SHIBOR rate in the past 6 years) to compute the Sharpe ratios for
UK-US, Eurozone-US portfolios and China A share -H share portfolio respectively.
All the Sharpe ratios of their CFDs trading are positive and much higher than zero,
from1.21-4.68 (incl.TC). However, their share trading shows the negative Sharpe ra-
tios from -0.17 to -3.24 (incl.TC). Above result illustrates the share trading approach
for the whole three portfolios are failed to lead the earning ability to beat up the
LIBOR or SHIBOR rates. However, CFDs approach can guarantee that.
From results shown that in all cases the proposed methodology is profitable. The
only exemption is for the UK-US and the Eurozone-US portfolios based on the share
approach. The transaction costs reduce but do not diminish the profitability of the
algorithm. It is interesting to note that the CFD approach is far more profitable than
the shares trading. This can be explained by the lower transaction cost and more
effective use of capital. The maximum drawdown figures are considerably low in all
cases under study. In the next graphs, we benchmark the performance of our models
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against the relevant home market indices before and after transaction costs. More
specifically for the UK-US portfolio we benchmark the results against the FTAS-ALL
SHARE (FTAS) index, for the Eurozone-US portfolio against the EURONEXT100
(N100) and for the China portfolio against the Shanghai Stock Exchange composite
index (SSE).
In addition, the composite index of FTAS-ALL SHARE (FTAS) index, EURONEXT100
(N100) and Shanghai Stock Exchange composite index (SSE) are respectively set
as the benchmark market indices to compute the information ratio of the UK-US,
Eurozone-US and China A-H share portfolios. Excluding the second period (15/10/2013
to 16/11/2015) of the China A-H share portfolio, all the Out-the-Sample information
ratios of three portfolios show positive figures. That means all these three portfo-
lios after deducting out the transaction costs still perform better than the index of
their located stock markets, by shown directly in the Figure 1.4 ∼ Figure 1.9. To
the Out-the-Samples of second period of the China A-H share portfolio, its negative
information ratio -0.83 (incl. TC) does not implies it unprofitable. Which could be
attributed by the policy bull market performed in the Shanghai stock market.
This paper proposes a novel trading approach for relative-price arbitrage. Through
setting the objective of maximising investor utility with the constraint that relative-
price discrepancy series is mean reverted by the cointegrated stocks, we have derived
the optimal trading weights which is to be adaptively and continually advised for
practical purpose. The proposed method can effectively liberate arbitrageurs from
the fierce competition of current traditional statistically arbitrage. This research
illustrates the particular form of investor utility function during the consequential
trading of relative-price arbitrage, which not only contributes to relax the restriction
that cointegrating vector is near one to be any figure but also to get an analytical
form solution of daily trading weights. Intuitively this implies the stochastic optimal
control could be potentially applied to relative-price trading with much wider cate-
gories of assets.
We have conducted extensive empirical analysis on cross listed stocks in US, UK, Eu-
rozone and Chinese markets based on the analytical solution of daily trading weight.
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It contains both in-sample and out-sample tests from July 2009 to November 2015.
Our results illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, especially for CFDs
trading. Our method performs better than that of the home market index without
significant bullishness, which further provides evidence that the time-delay arbitrage
of cross-listed stocks could be profitable. The superiority of the proposed approach
simply comes from avoiding the permanent anomalies of relative-price discrepancy of
and the shrinking spill- over impact on more and efficient global financial markets.
Our model has further implications on bilateral trading over the newly established
Shanghai-London Stock Connect and the forthcoming China’s Nasdaq as well. The
proposed trading strategy could be easily applied to the bilateral markets for cross
market arbitrage. It would be interesting and worthwhile to test the effectiveness of
our method on these bilateral market, which we leave for future research.
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Chapter 2
Implementing the Karatzas (1997)
stochastic general equilibrium
model to study wealth inequality
2.1 Introduction
Despite many researches have been done about wealth inequality such as wolff (1992),
Aiyagari (1994), Hugget (1996), Castaneda et al. (2003), De Nardi (2004, 2009) and
Piketty and Saez (2013, 2014) on the perspectives of dynastic models and overleap-
ing generation models (will be discussed later). Their researches mostly focus on
calibrating the inequality trajectories over time passing. Beyond current studies, on
perspective of theoretical, our research put more concentration on the evolution pro-
cess of wealth concentration, that is the key driver of inequality.
The wealth inequality was reversed to decline during the middle of the last century
due to a few particular causes, such as the two world wars, the Great Depression and
debt-fuel recession, which destroyed much wealth accumulated by the elite class, thus
reducing the inequality level at that time.
The world today is returning toward “patrimonial capitalism”, in which the inherited
wealth has a dominant portion of the economy, meanwhile the progressive income
tax and inheritance tax are not high enough to rebalance the social redistribution.
Piketty proposes that a progressive income tax reaching as high as 80%, would reduce
the wealth inequality, although this is “politically impossible”, thereby study on in-
heritance issue and income taxation are not the main focus in this thesis. Compared
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to the infeasibility of greater high taxation, a few other potential determinants of
wealth inequality, which have relative modest influences on the elite’s income and
inheritance, have been investigated by quantitative modelling. These potentially fea-
sible determinants that consumption risk aversion, the financial structure between
equity-financing and debt-financing, labor force’s welfare, they may light a way for-
ward, to relieve the extreme concentration of wealth.
Among these possible determinants, if it can be confirmed that consumption prefer-
ence has influential power on wealth concentration, then government could advocate
better consuming habits for households, to prevent wealth gap from the continuous
extensions. While whether the consumption preference has impact on inequality (
distribution of wealth) or not? It is still an controversial topic. Cagetti (2001) shows
that wealth concentration should be sensitive to the variation of the preference pa-
rameter in consuming utility function, conversely Krusell and Smith (1998) evidence
that risk averse coefficient in consumption does not affect the distribution of wealth.
Therefore it is essential to have a systematic investigation on the theoretical view-
point, to confirm whether (homogenous) heterogenous preferences of consumption
have impacts on wealth inequality, it would be one determinant of that.
Beyond the consumption preference, there may be existing other determinants in-
fluencing the evolution of wealth inequality, such as the labor-capital ratio, corpo-
rate capital structure, technology-specific investment (human capital), technological
progress (Total Factor Productivity) and labour force’s welfare. As an example,
intuitively the labor-capital ratio, capital structure respectively determines the attri-
bution level to capital suppliers (especially elite class) from the value-added. Thus it
is useful to check their influential power on the evolutions of wealth inequality from
a theoretical viewpoint. These tasks will be carried on step by step in the following
three chapters.
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2.2 Trend of wealth inequality
The US wealth inequality declined significantly from 1920 to 1970s, as evidenced by
Wolff and Marley (1989), Davies and Shorrocks (2000) and Piketty and Saez (2014).
Wolff (1992) indicates the share of total wealth held by the top 1% richest dropped
from 38% in 1922 to 19% in 1976. In the United States, the wealth inequality decrease
was likely led by the Great Depression and also the increased tax burden prevented
the richest from recovering after World War II, Kopczuk and Saez (2004). A similar
decrease of wealth inequality has been observed in the UK, Sweden and France, as
observed by Davies and Shorrocks (2000) and Piketty et al. (2006). However, their
inequality declined for years longer than the US, until the 1980s.
Since 1979, US income and wealth have been concentrating accompanying market
boom, the rise of internet fortunes and the financial crisis, based on the investigation
by Piketty and Saez (2003), Piketty and Saez (2014) and Wolff (2016). Generally, the
top 1% richest households in the United States hold around 40% of the total wealth,
and the top 5% hold more than half. At the other extreme that more than 10%
household have little or no assets. The share of total net private wealth owned by
the top 10% of wealth holders has been roughly rising from 67% to 75% since 1980 in
the United States. On the other hand, the top decile’s income share has been rising
from 36% to 50% of the total. The Gini coefficient of net wealth 1rose from 0.80
to 0.83 during 1979-1989. It was virtually stable at 0.83 around from 1989 to 2007.
Conversely it has been sharply elevating to 0.87 from 2007 to now. Although the Gini
coefficient of income has two falling periods respectively 2001-2004 and 2009-2010, it
has been rising from 0.48 to 0.58 roughly since 1979. Although delayed in years than
that of the US, the income and wealth in Europe have been starting to concentrate
again since the 1980s.
In the past century, the inequality of income and wealth fluctuated up and down in
the international perspectives. While in the recent 40 years, the top decile’s share
1Household’s net wealth (wealth per capita) after deducting liability.
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and Gini coefficient both imply the inequality of income and wealth has been ex-
tending. The wealth share owned by the top decile and Gini coefficient of wealth
are much greater than their corresponding income. This characterises that wealth is
more extremely concentrated than income; the deterioration of wealth inequality has
been more intractable than that of income throughout these 40years and seems set
to continue.
2.3 Existing models in wealth inequality studies
It is a stylized fact that wealth is more extremely concentrated than income, has
been highlighted by numerous studies, such as Wolff (1992), Castaneda et al. (2003),
Piketty and Saez (2014) and others. Economists attempt various sorts of model trying
to better understand the wealth inequality and its determinants as well. Quite a few
fruitful economic models exist to uncover the myth of wealth inequality, however,
most of which have limited empirical implications with regard to real observed income
inequality around the world. These models can be categorised as dynastic models, life-
cycle models, overlapping-generation models among others, which will be discussed
in details below.
2.3.1 Dynastic models
Here we first consider an infinitely-lived agent model with the objective
V (x) = max
(c,a′)
{u(c) +H0E[v(a′, z′) | (a, z)]} (2.1)
where c is agent’s consumption, a is the agent’s asset holdings carried, that is the
only asset choice that agents can use to self-insure against earning risk. a′ is the
saving for next period and u(c) is consumption utility. H0 is discounter, z is the
labor income shock generated exogenously. E[v(a′, z′) | (a, z)] is the agent’s expected
wealth conditional on the state (a, z).
The objective of maximising consumption and wealth is subjected to the following
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constraint:
c+ a′ = (1 + r)a+ zw (2.2)
where r is interest rate and w is the exogenous labor income.
The main framework of dynastic model is established by recursively maximising
agent’s consumption and expected discounted wealth with the consuming constraint
inclusive of labor income after the endowment shock, referring to Bewley (1977),
Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1996) among others for specific descriptions of this
framework. Moreover, it follows stationary equilibrium in that the aggregate capital
equals the aggregate labor. The aggregate capital and aggregate labor respectively
stands for the total saving and total labor supplied by all of the households of the
economy. This equilibrium assumes all households’ saving is accumulated by labor
income, but does not consider market clearing between aggregate output and con-
sumption.
Dynastic models have one drawback in that the wealth is significantly less concen-
trated than the observed data, as stated by Carroll (1997) that the intrinsic of this
model is the agent creating a buffer stock of asset to self-insure against income fluc-
tuations. However this model demonstrates that once the richer households have
reached high levels of wealth (save to buffer stock), they do not save in higher (even
zero) rates than the poorer. Following the argument by Dynan et al. (2004), it is
inconsistent with the empirical studies on saving rates and incapable of explaining
the creation of large fortunes.
Krusell and Smith (1998) add heterogeneity in discounter and consuming preference
to the general dynastic model. They found it is feasible to use specific stochastic
process for the discounter to replicate the variance of the cross-sectional distribution
of wealth, as risk aversion cannot. However Cagetti (2001) shows that distribution of
wealth should be associated with the risk averse coefficient in the utility function2.
2Lawrance (1991) and Cagetti (2003) empirically evidence that heterogenous preference has effect
on wealth inequality but the discounter is more significant.
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2.3.2 Overlapping generations models
As the cornerstone of overlapping generations models (OLG), the life-cycle theory
of consumption was developed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). Their frame-
work exposes that the finitely-living agent chooses consumption by maximising the
accumulating discounted utility of consumption (homogenous utility function for con-
sumption), subject to the remaining earnings (resources) up to the life end, while their
settings are deterministic, hereafter named as consumption constraint
at +
N∑
τ=t
yτ
(1 + r)τ+1−t
=
aL+1
(1 + r)L+1−t
+
L∑
τ=t
cτ
(1 + r)τ+1−t
(2.3)
where ct and yt respective denote the current consumption and income of the agent,
while cτ and yτ , for τ > t, denote expected income and planned consumption at the
τ th stage. at is assets at beginning of stage t. L is the finitely life span and N is the
agent’s earning span, N < T .
Assuming at = 0, aL+1 = 0, implies that agents have no inherited assets at the
beginning of its life, also do not receive any inheritance (gift) at any stage point of
life and that whole asset are only accumulated by saving. In addition, the current
and future planned consumption should be a homogenous function of current and ex-
pected income plus initial assets. This framework has intuitions for wealth inequality,
households keep on saving accompanying working, reach the maximum wealth level
just at the beginning of retirement, and then accumulate their savings to the life end.
Comparing with dynastic models, OLG models add intergeneration transfer on the
life-cycle theory of consumption with constant probability distribution of births and
deceases and labor income shock. That inheritance could be one significant cause of
wealth inequality was empirically checked by Davies (1982). After that, the OLG
model was updated about inequality of wealth. Its objective function is similar to
that of the dynastic (2.1)
V (x, t) = max
(c,a′)
{u(c) +H0E[v(a′, z′, t+ 1) | (a, z, t)]} (2.4)
taking the life-cycle into the considering is one difference, subject to
c+ a′ = (1 + r)a+ e(z, t)w + h+ b (2.5)
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it is consistent to the consumption constraint (2.3). Firstly, h denotes the accidental
bequests which are assumed to be redistributed by planner to the alive, and b is so-
cial security benefits to the retirees. Secondly, the fraction of population at different
age range are constant. Thirdly, the e(z, t) implies wage after labor income shock is
described by a probability distribution associated with age. The above three points
are the differences in the framework between dynastic models and OLG modes.
Comparing with dynastic models, OLG has an extra constraint on the stationary equi-
librium for the economy. Namely, the total lump-sum transfers to the alive households
equal accidental bequest by the deceased, under an balanced planner’s budget con-
straint during each stage.
The benchmark OLG models refer being to the ones shown by Huggett (1996) and
De Nardi (2004). Despite the population being inadequate of concentrating wealth in
the fat tails of wealth distribution by the OLS model. Its calibration results succeeds
in matching the observed Gini coefficient of wealth.
2.3.3 Other models
Under the main framework of dynastic, OLG models and beyond bequest, a few other
determinants of wealth inequality have been studied. Portfolio investment choice, one
of the most important determinants, has been treated heterogeneously by earning,
preference and age. Heaton and Lucas (2000) evidence that the value of a house-
hold’s business asset has effects on investment portfolio choice and asset pricing. In
addition, Yao and Zhang (2004) find that housing investment plays a significant role
in influencing the household’s investment portfolio. The various portfolio choices
linked with heterogenous wealth levels should lead recursively wealth to concentrate
over investment earnings not only labor incomes. Lusardi et al. (2017) show that
financial knowledge influences on portfolio choice, consequently being a key determi-
nant of wealth inequality in a stochastic life-cycle model with endogenous financial
knowledge accumulation, where financial knowledge enables individuals to make wiser
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investment choices when facing uncertainty and imperfect insurance market.
It is useful to study the wealth concentration by considering human capital ac-
cumulation, to disentangle the whole sets of transitory sources of inequality. Becker
and Tomes (1986) modelled that parents are altruistic in transfering to their chil-
dren, where both human capitals and bequests are characterised as the transferring
resources across generations. They show human capital transferring is relatively more
important than monetary (physical) assets transferring, the bequest takes place only
after an optimal threshold of human capital has been reached. Huggett et al. (2006)
modelled that human capital investment in presence of heterogeneous learning capa-
bilities and exogenous shocks, which could lead to determine the earning and wealth
inequality through life-cycle.
Income inequality is one directive cause of wealth inequality. Each agent’s revenue
contains earnings on business (financial) assets and labor incomes. In the income
portal, the taxation policy has dramatical effects on income inequality. In addition,
taxation boundary on inheritances could lead to wealth concentration. Using wealth
inequality data from China and India Piketty and Qian (2009) find that the pro-
gressive taxation is one of the distortionary policy tools in rising inequality. Cagetti
and De Nardi (2009) show that estate taxation does distort investment decision of
larger firms, thereby reducing aggregate output and savings. Removing the estate tax
by raising other taxation on households to reestablish fiscal balance, can benefit top
wealth quantile in a large welfare gain, but most of the population would suffer loss,
reflecting the wealth concentration. In addition, if inheritance has been considered
as one source of incomes, the inheritance taxation can also determine the wealth in-
equality. Piketty and Saez (2013) show the existence of optimal inheritance taxation
under maximising the long-run steady state social welfare; they assert the optimal
inheritance tax rate increase with the concentration of bequest received to balance
the wealth concentration and welfare.
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2.4 Motivation and structure
In this chapter, similar as the work done by Karatzas and Shreve (1998), an optimal
consumption will be solved out under general equilibrium with continuous stochastic
form. We will extend their work to the differing risk aversion owned by each house-
hold’s consumption. We obtain the solution of heterogenous individual’s consumption
level for simultaneously maximizing each household’s utility in both consumptions and
their final savings. Each household’s endowment is completely exogenous in a market
clearing economy with no financial investment activity setting directly. How does risk
aversion of consumption has impact on the level of wealth inequality will be studied.
2.5 Modelling setting
This chapter is to investigate whether household’s consumption preference influences
the wealth concentration and its volatility or not, during a finite dynasty where an
agent’s risk aversion is homogenous. We apply the framework introduced by Karatzas
et al. (1997) that one general equilibrium is established within a market clearing con-
dition between aggregated income and aggregated consumption3. Each household’s
income is heterogenous and exogenously given by stochastic processes assumed to be
progressively measurable with respect to the augmentation of the natural filtration
generated by an Rd valued Brownian motion W = (W1, ...,Wd)′ with a filtration as
(Ft). The main result of Karatzas et al. (1997) is that the closed-form solution of
optimal consumption is existing to implement a Pareto allocating rule (maximizing
household’s consumption utility simultaneously) in an completed market, 4 under the
market clearing condition in goods. In this framework, each household’s consump-
tion through the whole dynasty is consistent with the consumption constraint set by
3They also implicitly assume market clearing between aggregated investment and perishable
commodity.
4Under the market completeness of the first welfare theorem that economic planner can implement
a rule to satisfy the weak Pareto efficiency of resource allocation. Where the planner is able to
improve upon a decentralised market outcome, because all information are available to them and
market participant’s information are symmetric, no moral hazard or adverse selection possibility.
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Modigliani and Brumberg (1954).
2.5.1 Exogenous household’s income and the aggregation
There are K households, each of their income level5 is k(t), k = 1, 2, 3, · · · , K, which
is assumed to follow the dynamics
dk(t) = k(t)
(
µk(t)dt+
d∑
i=1
σkj(t)dWj(t)
)
. (2.6)
These processes, alongside the utility functions Uk(x) and consumptions of good are
the principal building blocks of the economy. Everything else is derived from these.
To proceed it is useful to introduce the aggregated income level process
(t) =
K∑
i=1
k(t). (2.7)
It follows the form, Eq. (2.6) that the dynamics of the aggregated income level is
given by
d(t) = (t) (ν(t)dt+ ρ(t)′dW(t)) , (2.8)
with
ν(t) =
K∑
k=1
k(t)
(t)
µk(t) (2.9)
ρ(t)′ =
(
K∑
k=1
k(t)
(t)
σk,1(t), · · · ,
K∑
k=1
k(t)
(t)
σk,d(t)
)
. (2.10)
For the numerical tractability it is helpful to assume that the income changes are
independent on the past, i.e.
E
(
i(t)
i(s)
∣∣∣∣Fs) = E( i(t)i(s)
)
. (2.11)
Otherwise the solution of the model will require more sophisticated methods of Monte
Carlo simulation.
5The salary level k(t) is defined as the expected total salary of the whole life [0, T ] at the filtration
Ft. At each time stage, based on the adaptive salary level k(t), the individual receives salary can
be computed as k(t)dt.
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2.5.2 Market clearing constraints
Karatzas et.al.(1997) consider the three market clearing constraints ensure the finan-
cial market equilibrium.
Clearing between aggregated consumptions and aggregated incomes:
K∑
k=1
ck(t) = (t), (2.12)
Clearing of households’ investment weights:
K∑
k=1
pikj(t) = 0, (2.13)
Clearing of households’ wealths:
K∑
k=1
Xk(t) = 0. (2.14)
2.6 Problem solving under CRRA Utility
It is difficult that using general constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility to
analytically solve out the optimal consumption. The particular form of CRRA utility
is helpful in solving this problem:
Uk(x) =
(
γ1−α
α
)
xα, γ > 0 (2.15)
where α plays the role of different risk aversion coefficient of household’s, α ∈
{−∞, 1}\{0}. Defining I(·) as the inverse function of the first derivative of the
k-th household’s utility:
Ik(x) = (U
′
k(x))
−1 = (γ1−αxα−1)−1 (2.16)
= (γα−1x)
1
α−1 (2.17)
then it exists
Ik
(
(t)
λk
)
=
(
γα−1
(t)
λk
) 1
α−1
(2.18)
where λk is a “Lagrange multiplier” in the problem that maximizing utility from
consumption, which is used in the 2.2.1 Proposition, 2.2.2 Theorem and 2.3.1 Theorem
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of Karatzas (1997).
Subject to the three market clearing conditions (2.12)-(2.14), Karatzas (1997) shown
in 3.4.1 Proposition that:
(t) = I(H0(t)e
∫ t
0 β(s)ds; Λ) (2.19)
where setting
I(x; Λ) =
K∑
k=1
Ik
(
x
λk
)
(2.20)
for any given Λ = (λ1, ..., λk) ∈ (0,∞)K . The function I(·; Λ) is continuous and
strictly decreasing, and maps (0,∞) onto itself with I(0+; Λ) =∞ and I(∞; Λ) = 0;
therefore, it has a continuous, strictly decreasing inverse H(·; Λ) projecting (0,∞)
onto (∞, 0), with H(0+; Λ) =∞ and H(∞; Λ) = 0, namely
I((t); Λ) = H((t); Λ)−1 (2.21)
and exists
I(H((t); Λ); Λ) = (t) (2.22)
Substituting (2.18) into (2.20), it gives
I((t); Λ) =
K∑
k=1
(
γα−1
(t)
λk
) 1
α−1
(2.23)
= (t)
1
α−1
K∑
k=1
γλ
1
1−α
k (2.24)
Subject to (2.21) and (2.24) yields
H((t); Λ) =
 (t)∑K
k=1 γλ
1
1−α
k
α−1 . (2.25)
In addition, the (2.19) and (2.22) gives
H0(t) = e
− ∫ t0 β(s)dsH((t); Λ) (2.26)
Aligned with Theorem 2.3.1 of Karatzas et al. (1997) and (2.26) the following equation
existing
E
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 β(s)dsH((t); Λ)Ik(H((t); Λ)
λk
)dt
= E
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 β(s)dsH((t); Λ)k(t)dt
(2.27)
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Overall, by plugging (2.17) and (2.25) into (2.27), after a few arrangements, we obtain
each household’s optimal consumption level:
c∗k(t) = (λ
∗
k)
1
1−αγ
(
(t)
(0)
)
, (2.28)
where
(λ∗k)
1
1−α =
(0)
γ
E
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 β(s)ds((t))α−1k(t)dt
E
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 β(s)ds((t))αdt
. (2.29)
Each household’s wealth at the start and end of the dynasty is zero, the Xk(0)
+ = 0
and has no capital accumulated after this dynasty Gk = 0 . To be matched to
Karataz’s work in this, subject to the generalised expression of household’s wealth
Appendix. E, (E.14) the wealth framework of each household’s in this section satisfies
Xk(t) =
1
H0(t)
Et
[∫ T
t
H0(s) [ck(s)− k(s))] ds
]
(2.30)
where k(t) is exogenously generated by process (2.6), each household’s income is
completely from labor income, in absence of capital investment. The state price den-
sity Ho(t) is given by (2.29), (2.25) and (2.26), with the exogenously given discounter
of money time value β(t).
2.7 Simulation and Analysis
The objective in this research is to investigate whether the homogenous preference
of household’s consumptions could influence wealth inequality or not in the economy
through out the whole finite-lived dynasty. In this section, the corresponding simu-
lation result for the model established in the section (2.5) and (2.6) is going to be
demonstrated. For the simplicity of the particular CRRA utility, the consumption
preference is driven by the risk aversion α but the γ in consumption utility keeps
constant, and the money discounter β is also time-invariant. By reordering the co-
efficient of risk aversion α range from -6 to -0.1 with the incremental -0.1, it allows
us to see whether the simulated averaging figure and the standard deviation of the
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wealth inequality (Gini coefficient process) is varing or not. The specific parameters
employed in this simulation test are given in the Table (2.1),
Table 2.1: Summary of key parameters in case 1
Parameter Symbol Value
Household number K 100
Terminal stage T 80
Number of income risk resources d 6
Initial income level k(0) 1
Income growth rate µ 1
Income volatility averaging σ¯kj 0.12
std.of income volatility σρ 0.02
Money discounter β 0.03
Invariant coefficient of risk aversion γ 2
Nonhomothetic coefficients of risk aversion α [−6.0 : −0.1 : −0.1]
Note: [a : b : c] denote the series on the closed interval from a to c with increment b.
Considering the form of net wealth could be negative, this issue can be solved by
employing the measurement of normalized Gini coefficient proposed by Chen et al.
(1982) that
G(t, ·) = 1−
1
K
∑K
ν=ω(t)+1[1 + 2(K − ν)]xν(t)
1 + 2
K
∑ω(t)
ν=1 νxν(t)
(2.31)
xν =
Xν(t)∑K
ν=1Xν(t)
(2.32)
{Xν(t), ν = 1, · · · , Kx} is the ascending order series of household’s wealth {Xk(t), k =
1, · · · , K} generated by (2.30) at each stage. To the first ω(t)th 6 lower xν(t) satisfies∑ω(t)
ν=1 xν(t) = 0 and
∑ω(t)+1
ν=1 xν(t) > 0, the ω(t)
th is time-variant. The Normalised
Gini coefficient is also the measurement of wealth inequality in the following chapters.
There are 100 households assumed living throughout the dynasty. Each household’s
labor income is following the geometric Brownian motion process subject to Eq. (2.6).
Every household’s initial income level and income growth rate are assumed to be in
homogeneity, namely k(0) = 1 and µk = µ = 1. Consequentially, their labor incomes
turn to be in heterogeneity because their income volatility factor are different. In
6ω(t) is to identify each household’s wealth ranking at each stage t, it is time-variant.
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simplicity, their various income volatility factors in all satisfy the distribution that
σkj ∼ N(σ¯kj, σρ), (2.33)
although it is strengthen that every household’s income shouldering the identical risk
resources under the differing magnitude dependent on the different volatilities. These
households’ incomes are given in the Figure 2.17:
Figure 2.1: Household’s labor income process throughout the whole dynasty, they are
generated following Eq. (2.6), parameters used in simulation are given in Table 2.1
7These exogenously given labor incomes also will be used in the simulation analysis of the next
chapter.
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Figure 2.2: consumption scatter accompanying the varying coefficients of risk aversion
and time passing, each consumption scatter is generated following Eq. (2.28) with
Eq. (2.29), parameters used in the simulation is shown in Table 2.1.
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(a) α = -6.0
(b) α = -0.1
Figure 2.3: consumption spectrum with the differing coefficients of risk aversion, α
The Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 together illustrate that under the homogenous con-
suming preference, the heterogenous income levels lead each household’s consumption
to be different at each stage. Their consumptions 8 have similar trends accompanying
8Subject to Eq. (2.28), the smooth of consumption spectrum is attributed by the comparative
smooth of the aggregated income (t) =
∑K
k=1 k(t), nevertheless each household’s income process
is stochastic.
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the increase of their incomes. The coefficient of risk aversion α has influence on the
concentration of households’ consumptions at each stage. The higher α implies the
more concentrated consumptions among households.
Figure 2.4: Wealth scatter along the varying coefficients of risk aversion and time
passing
63
(a) α = -6.0
(b) α = -0.1
Figure 2.5: wealth trajectories through time passing with different coefficients of risk
aversion, α
The Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 illustrate that risk aversions in consumption across
households could have impacts on the wealth trajectories. Specifically, the majority of
wealth series demonstrates the regime-switching from a converging trend to diverging,
then recover back to be converging till household’s wealth near to be zero. However
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this regime-switching status tend to disappear accompanying the coefficieints of risk
aversion α decreasing from -0.1 to -6.0.
(a) highest wealth surface
(b) lowest wealth surface
Figure 2.6: highest & lowest wealth surface corresponding differing risk aversion and
time stage
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The Figure 2.6 shows the highest wealth and lowest wealth under the same risk
aversion α in consumption are around symmetric. At a comparatively high α from
-0.1 to -6, the evolution trajectories for the highest (lowest) wealth by time passing
is regime-switching, it firstly diverges from the averaging wealth level 9 and then
converge back to the average wealth again. Other other hand, if the coefficient of risk
aversion α is a comparatively low such as −6, the initial wealth gap between top rich
(poor) with wealth averaging could be very large, this gap is converging back to the
averaging level to the end of dynasty. In addition, by observing the dimension that
highest (lowest) wealth level vs. risk averse coefficient alpha, the lower α implies that
the highest (lowest) wealth level deviates further from the averaging level (roughly
zero) at the initial stage.
Figure 2.7: Gini coefficient averaging vs. alpha
9subject to Figure 2.6, the averaging wealth is around zero during the whole dynastic life.
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Figure 2.8: Gini coefficient std. vs. alpha
Figure 2.7 illustrates that there is no significant effect of the risk aversion in
consumption on wealth inequality of the dynasty. However Figure 2.8 shows the
risk aversion could have impacts on the volatility of wealth inequality, these impacts
roughly follow the U-shaped relationship shown by the Gini std. fit line. This simula-
tion of the specific scenario may suggest that the coefficient of risk aversion α ranging
from -4 to -5 could be an optimal interval to reduce the volatility of the dynastic
inequality on wealth.
2.8 Conclusion and future research
This chapter explores the consumption-saving framework explained by Karatzas (1997)
which is under stochastic general equilibrium, by applying convex duality optimisa-
tion. Each household’s income is exogenously given with implicated financial market
exchanging economy. There is a pair of comparative studies has been implemented,
the simulations illustrate the risk aversion level in homogenous consumption prefer-
ences have no obvious impacts on the evolutions of wealth. However, the theoreti-
cally modelling suggests the homogenous risk aversion could influence the evolution
patterns of wealth concentration, the simulations shown the less risk averse, the evo-
lutions of wealth more probably show regime-switch during a dynasty, this implies a
weaker stratification of the wealth inequality.
In respect to the future robustness check, subject to the Table 2.1, the risk invariant
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coefficient of risk aversion γ could be adjusted to other varying level, to check whether
the regime-switch of wealth concentration trend through the dynasty is still existing
or not. More further, the real calibration could be applied, by estimating the income
growth rate, money discounter with classifying the different risk stems.
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Chapter 3
Optimal consumption under
quadratic utility
3.1 Introduction
Comparing with Karatzas (1997), this chapter we worked out an equilibria state price
density, that is endogenously determined by risk aversion, deposit rate and house-
hold?s revenue level. This also simplify the whole modelling in describing the wealth
concentration progress. In addition, each household’s optimal consumption is set as
maximising the utility for their accumulative consumptions as simultaneous as their
utilities in terminal wealth at the end of dynasty. Also, we release the constraint on
the clearing that aggregated investment weights are zero. We are adopting quadratic
utility function benefits us to extend the problem from homogenous consumption
preference to the heterogeneous, although the whole optimisation framework is still
under convex duality approach. The simulation is also carried out on the premise
of household?s income being exogenously given and implicating no financial capital
gain flow from business sectors. Meanwhile we release the constraint on the equilib-
rium where aggregated wealth and investment weight are both zero. Also the optimal
consumption solution is to maximises household’s utilities in consumption as well as
their terminal wealth utilities of the dynasty. This chapter illustrates the homogenous
(heterogeneous) risk aversion can affect the progressing of wealth concentration, re-
mind us that just employing wealth inequality measure could let us neglect the social
stratification problem as worse than we think.
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3.2 Modelling setting
3.2.1 State Price Density and wealth framework
For convenience in using the state price density of wealth hereafter, one sort of its
generalised form has been denoted. When evaluating each individual’s wealth, it is
essential to adjust the extra risk and money time value. The extra risk adjustor is
according to
dZ(t) = −Z(t)θ(t)′dW (t), Z(0) = 1, (3.1)
where θ(t) is the price of market risk and W (t) = (W1(t) · · ·Wz(t))′ is a z-dimensional
independent Brownian motion vector, standing for z risk sources on asset prices.
Denoting the state-price density of individual’s wealth as H0(t) involves a money time
value discounter and the extra risk adjustor. The generalised form of H0(t) can be
expressed as
H0(t) = e
−rtZ(t)
= e−(rt+
∫ t
0 θ(τ)
′dW (τ)+ 1
2
∫ t
0 ‖θ(τ)‖2dτ), 0 < τ < t,
(3.2)
and its dynamics follows
dH0(t) = −H0(t)
(
rdt+ θ(t)′dW (t)
)
(3.3)
Each individual’s wealth satisfies the dynamics
dXk(t) = (rXk(t) + k(t)− ck(t)) dt, (3.4)
where ck(t) is the individual’s consumption level at the filtration Ft, ck(t)dt is individ-
ual’s consumption at t. Each individual wealth is consistent with the measure of net
worth, it includes all assets (real estate, financial wealth and vehicles) and liabilities
(mortgages and other debts) held by the household, all of these taking place through
an exchange economy.
In this section, it is highlighted that each household’s investment has still not been
considered. Therefore, each household’s income source is just their labor incomes.
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Financial investment activity condition imposing the issue of the price of market risk
does not need to be considered, this is a particular case of Eq. (3.2) in absence of
stochastic terms. Then, the state price density for individual’s wealth in absence of
investing, is equivalent to a money time value discounter
H10 (t) = e
−rt. (3.5)
Subject to the generalized expression of wealth, Appendix E. (E.14) and Eq. (3.4),
Eq. (3.5), also assuming that each household’s wealth just at the start of the initial
stage is zero Xk(0)
+ = 0 and no capital accumulated throughout the whole dynasty
Gk = 0 , then each individual’s wealth is
Xk(t) =
1
H10 (t)
Et
∫ T
t
H10 (s) (ck(s)− k(s)) ds (3.6)
It is stressed that the state price density is exogenously dependent on the interest
rate r at current position as shown in Eq. (3.5), but it turns to be endogenously
dependent on the risk averse coefficient γ and household’s income level after below
modelling, illustrated by Eq. (3.31) forthcoming.
3.3 Optimal consumption under quadratic utility
For the tractability in solving the heterogenous optimal consumption level, we choose
a quadratic form of consumption utility
Uk(ck(t)) = ck(t)− 1
2
γkc
2
k(t), γk > 0, ck(t) ∈
(
0, γ−1k
)
, (3.7)
where γk is heterogenous risk aversion in consumption, which varies among different
households.
Its derivative U ′k(ck(t)) = 1 − γkck(t) and the inverse of the derivative, denoted as
Ik(ck(t)) = [U
′
k(ck(t))]
−1 = (1 − ck(t))/γk are both strictly decreasing with ck(t) ∈(
0, γ−1k
)
. In a general form
Ik(x) =
1− x
γk
. (3.8)
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Based on the Legendre-Fenchel transform (Rockafellar (1970) Karatzas and Shreve,
1998),
U˜k(λk)
∆
= max
ck(t)∈(0,γ−1k )
{Uk(ck(t))− λkck(t)} = Uk(Ik(λk))− λkIk(λk), (3.9)
the domain of λk should be identical to that of ck(t), namelyλk ∈
(
0, γ−1k
)
. U˜k(λk) is
a convex decreasing function and satisfies
U˜ ′k(λk) = (λk − 1)/γk, λk ∈
(
0, γ−1k
)
, (3.10)
Uk(ck(t)) = min
λk∈(0,γ−1k )
{
U˜(λk) + ck(t)λk
}
, ck(t) ∈
(
0, γ−1k
)
(3.11)
= U˜ ((λk − 1)/γk) + ck(t)(λk − 1)/γk , (3.12)
U˜k(γ
−1
k ) = U(0), U˜k(0) = U(γ
−1
k ). (3.13)
Solving the optimal consumption level c∗k(t), this problem can be treated as one
stochastic controlling with,
the objective function1 :
G = argmax
ck(t)
E
[∫ T
0
Uk(ck(t))dt+ Uk(Xk(T ))
]
= argmax
ck(t)
E
[∫ T
0
(ck(t)− 1
2
γkc
2
k(t))dτ +Xk(T )−
1
2
γkX
2
k(T )
] (3.14)
s.t.
Constraint 1:
E
[∫ T
0
H0(t)ck(t)dt+H0(T )Xk(T )
]
≤ Xk(0), (3.15)
Intuitively, it is one budget constraint that the expected discounted terminal wealth
plus the expected discounted total consumptions cannot exceed each individual’s
initial endowment. The discounting is accomplished by the state price density H0(t).
Also it almost surely exists by the proof in Appendix A.
Constraint 2:
dXk(t) = [rXk(t) + Ek(t, ·)− ck(t)] dt+ σ(t,Xk, ·)dW (t), (3.16)
1The optimal consumption should benefit the individual achieving the highest expectation of
total consumption utility throughout the whole life long. If the household’s revenue exceeds the
rational consumption, then they saves (invests) the retained revenue (to earn more) for the future
consumption. Conversely, if they are confident for their future earning ability, nonetheless current
revenue is less than their rational consumption. They may choose an overdraft consumption.
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where Ek(t, ·) is each individual’s whole revenue level at the filtration Ft from all feasi-
ble revenue resources. σ(t, Ek, Xk, ·)) is an diffusion factor, W (t) is the z-dimensional
independent Brownian motion vector as that of Eq. (3.1)
Subjected to Eq. (3.1), Eq. (3.2) and Eq. (3.16) by applying Ito’s formula on
Z(t)e−rtXk(t), it can offer one generalized expression of adjusted individual’s wealth
dynamics
dH0(t)Xk(t) = H0(t) (Ek(t, ·)− ck(t)) dt+H0(t)Ω(t, σ,Xk, θ, ·)dW (t), (3.17)
where the diffusion term Ω has different form up to particular scenarios.
Constraint 3:
K∑
k=1
c∗k(t) = E(t, ·), (3.18)
It is market equilibrium between aggregated production level and consumption level.
where E(t, ·) is the produce level of total goods at filtration Ft in the whole economy.
Subject to Eq. (3.12) and imposing constraint 1, Eq. (3.15) to the objective, Eq.
(3.14) with optimization multiplier λk ∈
(
0, γ−1k
)
, yields
E
[∫ T
0
Uk(ck(t))dt+ Uk(Xk(T ))
]
+λk
{
Xk(0)− E
[∫ T
0
H0(t)ck(t)dt+H0(T )Xk(T )
]}
= E
∫ T
0
[Uk(ck(t))− λkH0(t)ck(t)] dt
+E [Uk(Xk(T ))− λkH0(T )Xk(T )] + λkXk(0)
≤ E
∫ T
0
U˜k(λkH0(t))dt+ EU˜k(λkH0(T )) + λkXk(0).
(3.19)
Following Eq. (3.12), to achieve the objective, Eq. (3.14), namely leading Eq. (3.19)
to equality, the following conditions should be satisfied:
ck(t) = Ik (λkH0(t)) =
1− λkH0(t)
γk
, (3.20)
X∗k(t) = Ik (λkH0(T )) =
1− λkH0(T )
γk
, (3.21)
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thus it can be primarily confirmed that
c∗k(t) ∈
{
ck(t) =
1− λkH0(t)
γk
}
. (3.22)
Further, subject to constraint 2, Eq. (3.16) and Eq. (3.2), temporally setting Z(t) = 1
and integrating dZ(t)e−rtXk(t) from 0 to T and taking expectation, obtain
E
∫ T
0
H0(t)ck(t)dt = E
∫ T
0
H0(t)Ek(t, ·)dt+Xk(0)−H0(T )E(Xk(T )). (3.23)
Substituting Eq. (3.22) into Eq. (3.23) gives
1
γk
E
∫ T
0
H0(t)dt− λk
γk
E
∫ T
0
H20 (t)dt =
E
∫ T
0
H0(t)Ek(t, ·)dt+Xk(0)−H0(T )E(Xk(T )),
(3.24)
this switches the problem from solving c∗k(t) to solving λ
c,∗
k ∈ {λk} which satisfies Eq.
(3.24).
Plugging Eq. (3.20) into the constraint 3, Eq. (3.18), gives
E(t, ·) =
K∑
k=1
Ik (λ
c,∗
k H0(t)) , (3.25)
additionally, assuming state price density is dependent on every household’s income
level and their risk aversion in consumption, satisfies the intermediated form that
H0(t) = H(E1(t, ·), ..., EK(t, ·);λc,∗1 , ..., λc,∗K ), (3.26)
Then plugging Eq. (3.26) back into Eq. (3.25) the aggregated income (output) can
be temporarily written with the intermediated form H as
E(t, ·) =
K∑
k=1
Ik(λ
c,∗
k H), (3.27)
Simultaneously Eq. (3.8) and Eq. (3.27) lead
E(t, ·) =
K∑
k=1
1
γk
(1− λc,∗k H) (3.28)
H(E1(t, ·), ..., EK(t, ·);λc,∗1 , ..., λc,∗K ) =
∑K
k=1
1
γk
− E(t, ·)∑K
k=1
λc,∗k
γk
. (3.29)
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Subjected to Eq. (3.26) and Eq. (3.29) and H0(0) = 1, they contribute us
K∑
k=1
λc,∗k
γk
=
K∑
k=1
1
γk
− E(0, ·), (3.30)
H0(t) =
∑K
k=1
1
γk
− E(t, ·)∑K
k=1
1
γk
− E(0, ·) . (3.31)
Substituting Eq. (3.31) into Eq. (3.24)
1
γk
E
∫ T
0
∑K
k=1
1
γk
− E(t, ·)∑K
k=1
1
γk
− E(0, ·)dt−
λc,∗k
γk
E
∫ T
0
(∑K
k=1
1
γk
− E(t, ·)∑K
k=1
1
γk
− E(0, ·)
)2
dt
= E
∫ T
0
∑K
k=1
1
γk
− E(t, ·)∑K
k=1
1
γk
− E(0, ·)Ek(t, ·)dt+Xk(0)−H0(T )E(Xk(T )),
(3.32)
by re-ordering, we obtain the solution of optimal multiplier λc,∗k for maximising each
household’s utility in consuming as
λc,∗k =
Γ− E(0, ·)
E
∫ T
0
[Γ− E(t, ·)]2dt
{E
∫ T
0
[Γ− E(t, ·)][1− γkEk(t, ·)]dt
+γkGk[Γ− E(0, ·)]},
(3.33)
where Γ =
∑K
k=1
1
γk
and Gk = E(H0(T )Xk(T )) −Xk(0) is the desired growth rate of
wealth by each household, up to stage T.
Subject to Eq. (3.22), Eq. (3.31) and Eq.(3.33), it yields us an generalised solution
of each household’s optimal consumption level
c∗k(t) =
1
γk
− Γ− E(t, ·)
γkE
{∫ T
0
[Γ− E(t, ·)]2dt
}E{∫ T
0
[Γ− E(t, ·)][1− γkEk(t, ·)]dt
}
−GkXk(0)[Γ− E(0, ·)][Γ− E(t, ·)]
E
{∫ T
0
[Γ− E(t, ·)]2dt
}
(3.34)
Each household’s revenue purely stems from the salary generated exogenously by
Eq. (2.6), because there is no financial investment activity in this economy, the
consequence is that no extra market risk to be borne in evaluating wealth. Then
isolated exogenous incomes and aggregation are matched to the element of generalised
form solution of optimal consumption:
Ek(t, ·) = k(t),
E(t, ·) = (t),
(3.35)
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Each household’s rational consumption level can simultaneously maximise the utilities
of consumptions and terminal wealth saving satisfying
c∗k(t) =
1
γk
− Γ− (t)
γkE
{∫ T
0
[Γ− (t)]2dt
}E{∫ T
0
[Γ− (t)][1− γkk(t)]dt
}
−GkXk(0) [Γ− (0)][Γ− (t)]
E
{∫ T
0
[Γ− (t)]2dt
}
(3.36)
Considering each household’s wealth just at the start and the termination of the dy-
nasty to be both zero, Xk(T ) = Xk(0) = 0, then is subject to Gk = E(H0(T )Xk(T ))−
Xk(0), it gives us the expected growth rate of wealth Gk = 0. In addition, subject to
Γ =
∑K
k=1
1
γk
and (t) =
∑K
k=1 k(t), setting
1
γk
< k(t), can guarantee Γ − (t) < 0
also equivalents 1
k(t)
< γk ensures 1 − γkk(t) < 0. Therefore, based on the over-
all condition, c∗k(t) will be positive. Otherwise, the sign of c
∗
k(t) cannot be analysed
unless by using numerical experiment.
3.4 Simulation and Analysis
Following the solution of optimal consumption under the quadratic utility function
Eq. (3.36), there are a few simulated tests going to be taken, namely whether the ho-
mogenous coefficient of risk aversion (γ) can influence the wealth concentration (both
averaging Gini and its volatility) along the dynasty or not. The rest respect of the
heterogenous risk averse in consumption to determine whether or not the magnitude
of difference among household’s risk aversions (different standard deviations on the
heterogenous risk averse coefficients, γk) have impacts on wealth concentration.
3.4.1 The effect of homogenous consuming preference on wealth
inequality
Each household’s income process still employs the identical one in the last chapter,
as shown in Figure 2.1. The coefficient of risk aversion is γ under the quadratic
utility function described in the modelling section (3.3) but it is homogenous in this
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simulation. In oder to check whether or not this homogenous risk averse γ could
determine wealth inequality, it ranges from 0.05 to 0.35 with the incremental 0.005.
Table 3.1: Summary of key parameters in case 2
Parameter Symbol Value
Household number K 100
Terminal stage T 80
Number of income risk resources d 6
Initial income level k(0) 1
Income growth rate µ 1
Income volatility averaging σ¯kj 0.12
std. of income volatility σρ 0.02
Expected growth rate on wealth Gk 0
Variant coefficients of risk aversion γ [0.05 : 0.005 : 0.35]
Figure 3.1: spectrum of state price density with gamma domain 0.05 to 0.35
The Figure 3.1 graphs the spectrum of state price endogenously generated by the
household’s incomes and their corresponding homogenous risk averse in consumption,
by following Eq. (3.31). This spectrum shows that state price density is increasing
by a higher risk averse γ with reasonable characteristics. Eq. (3.5) and Eq. (3.31)
contribute
∑K
k=1
1
γk
−E(t,·)∑K
k=1
1
γk
−E(0,·) = e
−rt, this implicates that the interest rate r is endogenously
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driven by aggregated income level E(t, ·) and the set of risk averse γk.
Figure 3.2: Consumption scatter along the varying of risk averse coefficient and time
stage
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(a) γ = 0.05
(b) γ = 0.35
Figure 3.3: consumption spectrum with differing gamma
From Figure 2.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 demonstrate that each household’s con-
sumption level is roughly positive to their income level under the optimal consumption
under quadratic utility. In addition, accompanying the risk averse γ increasing and
dynasty life passing, households’ consumptions tend to be more concentrated.
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Figure 3.4: Wealth scatter along the varying of risk averse coefficient and time stage
80
(a) γ = 0.05
(b) γ = 0.35
Figure 3.5: wealth trajectory through time with differing gamma
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show under optimal consumption with quadratic util-
ity, the risk aversion γ has determine power on wealth concentration. The lower γ
attributes households’ wealths converging more steeply to the averaging wealth level
(zero) among households. Additionally, results illustrate that the discrete magnitude
among households’ wealth is highest at the just starting point of the dynasty.
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(a) highest wealth surface
(b) lowest wealth surface
Figure 3.6: highest & lowest wealth surface corresponding to differing gammas and
stage
Figure 3.6 illustrate the highest and lowest wealth at each dynastic stage symmet-
rically converging to zero along time passing. By rising the risk averse γ, both the
highest and lowest converging speeds turn to be faster. In addition, the higher risk
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averse γ implies the deviation of highest (lowest) household’s wealth is greater from
the common wealth level (zero in this case, because it default no capital accumulated
throughout the whole dynasty).
Figure 3.7: Gini coefficient averaging vs. γ
Figure 3.8: Gini coefficient std. vs. γ
Although Figure 3.7 shows a negative correlation between risk averse γ and Gini
mean of the dynasty, it is not observable to suggest the risk averse in household’s con-
sumption has a significant influencing power on wealth inequality. Figure 3.8 cannot
confirm a clear relationship between risk aversion in consumption and the volatility
of wealth inequality throughout the dynasty. However, under the second-order Taylor
polynomial fitting, there is one U-shaped relationship existing between them.
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3.4.2 Effect of heterogenous consuming preference on wealth
inequality
In this section, the risk averse coefficient in consumption utility will be switched from
the homogenous to be heterogenous among households. The differing risk averse
coefficient is set as γk satisfies the normal distribution that
γk ∼ N(γ, σ2γk), (3.37)
the risk averse coefficient mean is located as γ = 0.2 in this simulation. σγk is the
standard deviation, it stands for the discreteness of the different risk averse coefficient
in consumption. This simulation is to investigate whether or not the discreteness of
the differing risk averse coefficient γk in consumption is one of determinants of the
wealth concentration of households.
Household income is still exogenously given and identically matched to the result
generated in the simulation section (2.7, Figure 2.1) by the process, Eq. (2.6). All the
other parameters are the same as the previous two simulations, only the heterogenous
risk averse coefficient set. The standard deviation of risk averse coefficient ranges from
0.0105 to 0.04 with the incremental 0.0005.
Table 3.2: Summary of key parameters in case 3
Parameter Symbol Value
Household number K 100
Terminal stage T 80
Number of income risk resources d 6
Initial income level k(0) 1
Income growth rate µ 1
Income volatility averaging σ¯kj 0.12
std. of income volatility σρ 0.02
Expected growth rate on wealth Gk 0
Risk averse coefficient averaging γ 0.2
Std. of risk averse coefficient σγk [0.0105 : 0.0005 : 0.04]
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Figure 3.9: Consumption scatter along the varying std. of risk averse coefficient and
stage
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(a) gamma std. = 0.01
(b) gamma std. = 0.04
Figure 3.10: consumption spectrum with differing std. of averaging gamma 0.20
Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 reflect that the consumption level of households’ are
changing from “parallelized” consumptions with their income level, to the switching-
styled among consumptions, accompanying the widening (diverging) discreteness of
risk aversion in consumption (the standard deviation of gamma moving from 0.01 to
0.04).
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Figure 3.11: simulated wealth scatter along the varying std. of constant gamma 0.2
and time stage
Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 shown it could not prevent household’s wealth from
converging to zero at the end, with adjusting the differentiation magnitude of het-
erogenous consumption preference (the discreteness of differing risk aversion coeffi-
cient, γk). However, if risk aversions are more discrete among households, then the
smoother their wealth converging to the same level along time passing. In addition,
the results show that the averaging level (common level) of wealth distribution at each
time stage is not roughly zero anymore as similar in previous simulations. It could
be argued that the discreteness of risk aversion in consumptions may have effects on
the averaging level of households’ wealth.
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(a) gamma std. = 0.01
(b) gamma std. = 0.04
Figure 3.12: wealth trajectory through time with differing std. of fixed gamma 0.20
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(a) highest wealth surface
(b) lowest wealth surface
Figure 3.13: highest & lowest wealth surface corresponding differing std. of constant
gamma 0.20
Figure 3.13 illustrates that the higher discreteness of risk aversion of household’s
consumption leads the higher highest-wealth (lowest-wealth) level. The highest and
lowest wealth are symmetrically converging to the zero value of capital accumulated
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at the end of the dynasty.
Figure 3.14: Gini coefficient averaging vs. std. of gamma
Figure 3.15: Gini coefficient std. vs. std. of gamma
The wealth inequality roughly is positive to discreteness of risk aversion in con-
sumption, however it cannot significantly influence the inequality. Similarly, there is
no obvious impact of discreteness of the differing risk aversion in consumption on the
volatility of wealth inequality.
3.5 Conclusion and future research
This chapter we improved it is more consistent to reality that the state price density
satisfies the equilibrium level endogenously driven by risk aversion, deposit rate and
household’s revenue levels jointly. This also simplify the whole modelling in describing
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the wealth concentration progress. In addition, each household?s optimal consump-
tion is set as maximising the utility for their accumulative consumptions and their
utility in terminal wealth at dynasty end. We are adopting quadratic utility function
benefits us to extend the problem from homogenous consumption preference to the
heterogeneous. This chapter illustrates the homogenous (heterogeneous) risk aver-
sion can affect the progressing of wealth concentration, however cannot affect wealth
inequality obviously. On the other hand, this result is equivalent to previous chap-
ter conclusion, as one of robustness comparing. Moreover, the deviation magnitude
among differing risk aversion has no significant impact on wealth inequality, however
can influence the evolution of wealth concentrations.
For the robustness check planned in the future, subject to the Table 3.1, the expected
growth rate on wealth could be set as varying in different, it could be comparing
calibrations among multilateral nations, they have differentiated GDP growth rate,
treating them as equivalent as the wealth growth rate. On the other hand, the in-
come growth rate should be set as differentiated and consistent to its real trend.
Thereby, subject to the Figure 3.5, we may check whether the economic growth (in-
come progress level) is one important determinant causing the regime-switch of wealth
concentration trend through the dynasty is still existing or not.
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Chapter 4
Determinants of wealth inequality
with endogenous income
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is still consistent to general equilibrium framework with maximizing
social welfare, achieve the Pareto optimality of household’s consumption, produc-
tive factors and structures at each stage, simultaneously maximizing terminal wealth.
Hesitating from previous chapter, the market clearing condition just keep the aggre-
gated incomes equal to the aggregated consumption.
In the previous chapters, household’s income is given exogenously and only stems
from labor incomes. However, the real household’s income should constitute labor
wage and financial capital gain, because households contributing their labor forces
and savings to different kinds of business sectors in an exchanging economy with fi-
nancial market. Thus, it could be essential to see whether dynamics of factors and
structures during business sector’s development have influences or not, on the evolu-
tions of wealth inequality, initiated from an economic complex system.
Moreover, comparing with the previous two chapters and Karatzas (1997), we en-
dogenote the wage and capital gain under a complex economic system which is not
only compatible with neoclassical economic growth framework. Also, the complex
economic system built in this chapter, it let us glance on if the latecomer’s advantage
advocated have powerful effect on inequality on the multilateral country sides. The
latecomer’s advantage is advocated by Lin (2011) to the global technological frontier,
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can be adoptable for the developing counties in the globalised open trade environ-
ment.
The real household’s income should constitute labor wage and financial capital gain,
because households contributing their labor forces and savings to different kinds of
business sectors in an exchanging economy with financial market. Contingent claim
analysis is crucial for our system, it enables the allocation of output (industrial value-
added) to capital suppliers and labor suppliers are dynamically varying, adaptive
to the technological gap shrinking (catching up) between developing and developed
countries.
4.2 Modelling
This chapter builds a theoretical model to see whether some endogenously productive
factors and structures could influence the wealth inequality or not? Comparing with
the previous chapters, this chapter will embed the wealth inequality study into a neo-
classical economic growth model, whose labor incomes and financial capital gain are
heterogeneously and endogenously driven by business sector’s progress in labor (tech-
nological) productivity. Moreover, each household’s consumption still satisfies the
Pareto optimality as shown as previous chapter, meanwhile household dynamically
invest their savings (after consumings) into an incomplete financial market following
general strategies.
By utilising the approach of contingent claim analysis, the closed-form solution for
the labor and financial capital have been obtained, and several dimensions have been
involves inside, such as total factor productivity (TFP), productive factors and out-
put. Furthermore, household income stems from wage and financial capital gain,
compensating them for supplying labor and capital to business sectors. Moreover, at
each stage, the financial asset available for each household’s investment is determined
after their optimal consumption, which is consistent with the work in the Chapter 3.
Based on these premises , we check whether a few factors have influential power on
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the evolution of wealth inequality or not, by using simulating experiments, it obtains
a few innovative answers.
4.2.1 Individual’s wealth within investment gain
Each individual act as a productive factors (capital and labor) supplier. They con-
tribute labor and financial capital (equity, lending etc., physical capital is capitalised
to be financial capital) to various kinds of business sectors. Each household may sup-
ply either one or simultaneously supply both two kind of productive factors. In return
they receive revenue from the business sector working for. The revenue is constituted
by the wage (basic salary and bonus) by supplying the labor force to sectors, also
include financial capital gain (equity gain and interest) by supplying financial capital.
Households reply on their revenue to maintain the daily consumption in priority. For
consuming more in the future, they reinvest the retained savings on different busi-
ness sectors via a completed financial market at each period end, following general
investing strategies.
There are n + 1 securities trading continuously in the market, corresponding to the
n business entities1 and one money market B(t), such as the treasury bill. For sim-
plicity, the riskless interest rate is constant r, money price evolves according to
dB(t) = rB(t)dt (4.1)
The evolutions of the price-per-share of the security Pi(t) of the i
th business entity at
stage t satisfy:
dPi(t) = Pi(t)dt
(
bi(t) +
z∑
j=1
σij(t)dWj(t)
)
, i = 1, ..., n. (4.2)
where bi(t) is the drift of the i
th risky security, in vector {b(t) = (b1(t), ..., bn(t))′} and
σijdWj(t) are the risk sources driven by the independent z-dimensional Brownian mo-
tions W (t) = (W1(t), · · · ,Wz(t))′. With this interpretation, the volatility coefficient
1A few business sectors have subordinate or joint relationships. Nonetheless juxtaposing them
as completely securitised
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σij(t) reflects the intensity of the j
th source of uncertainty influences the price of the
ith risky security, in vector process σ(t) = {σij(t)}n×z.
In absence of labor income from business sectors, financial capital gain from their
investment (putting their savings into the correspond physical capital in different
business sectors) could be the only source for households to maintain their consump-
tions. Under this circumstance every household’s wealth Xk(t) at time t can be
presented as:
dXk(t) =
n∑
i=1
pik,i(t)
dPi(t)
Pi(t)
+
(
Xk(t)−
n∑
i=1
pik,i(t)
)
dB(t)
B(t)
− ck(t)dt
=
n∑
i=1
pik.i(t)
(
bi(t) +
z∑
j=1
σij(t)dWj(t)
)
+
(
Xk(t)−
n∑
i=1
pik,i(t)
)
rdt− ck(t)dt
= pi′k(t)[(b(t)− r1n)dt+ σ(t)dW (t)]− ck(t)dt+ rXk(t)dt
(4.3)
where 1n = (1, ..., 1)
′, pik,i(t) denotes how much money the kth household invests in
each of the available securities, pik(t) = (pik,1(t), · · · , pik,n(t))′ and the term Xk(t) −∑n
i=1 pik,i(t) is each household’s investment in money market.
After inserting the wage part k(t) into the revenue and rewriting Eq.(4.3) with matrix
forms. The household’s wealth dynamic satisfies
dXk(t) = [k(t) + rXk(t)− ck(t)]dt+ pik(t)′[(b(t)− r1n)dt+ σ(t)dW (t)]. (4.4)
Following portfolio theory, Markowitz (1952), the specific form of the price of market
risk θ(t), can be presented as
θ(t) = σ(t)′(σ(t)σ(t)′)−1(b(t)− r1n).
b(t) =
(
b1(t) · · · bi(t) · · · bn(t)
)
1×n
σ(t) =

σ11(t) · · · σ1j(t) · · · σ1z(t)
...
. . .
...
σi1(t) σij(t) σiz(t)
...
. . .
...
σn1(t) · · · σnj(t) · · · σnz(t)

n×z
(4.5)
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b(t) is the matrix of capital return rate covering the whole categories of business sec-
tors. σ(t) is a market risk matrix fully covering the risk sources from all financings
for the whole physical capitals in the business sectors2.
4.2.2 Household’s revenue
Each household’s salary level k(t) can be regarded as the varying labour value Li(t, ·)
accumulative throughout the whole dynasty. For simplicity, the salary payment fol-
lows equalitarianism inside each business sector i, where mi,L is the constant number
of employees working for it:
k(t)dt
∆
= dLi(t)/mi,L, (4.6)
On the other side, the earning rate bi(t) for each unit financing security of sector i is
denoted as
bi(t)dt
∆
= dFi(t)/
(
ni,FPi(t)
)
, (4.7)
where Pi is the endogenous security price and ni,F is fixed number of securities issued
by the sector i. Li(t, ·) and Fi(t, ·) are determined by the changes of different specific
factors will be shown by Eq. (4.49) and Eq. (4.50) later.
Subject to Eq, (4.6) and Eq. (4.9), their discrete form can be written as
k(t)∆t
∆
= ∆Li(t)/mi,L (4.8)
bi(t)∆t
∆
= ∆Fi(t)/
(
ni,FPi(t)
)
, (4.9)
It is crucial to solve out the set containing every household’s investment portfolio on
each security at time stage, {pik,i(t)}n×K . It is strength that pik,i(t), t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , T
should meet the below constraints simultaneously.
The constraint of the sum of each row, corresponds the market value of each business
sector at stage t:
K∑
k=1
pik,i(t+ ∆t) = ni,FPi(t), (4.10)
2In this research, the physical capital is assumed equivalent to the financial capital.
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intuitively, among the K households, the aggregation of their investment weights on
the business sector i during stage t+ ∆t is roughly equal to the unit security price of
the sector i multiplied by its security amount ni,F .
The constraint of the sum of each column, corresponds to each household’s wealth
figure at stage t:
subject to Eq. (4.4) in discrete form,
if the kth order household’s net wealth is positive, Xk(t) + [k(t) + rXk(t) −
ck(t)]∆t +
∑n
i=1 pik,i(t)[bi(t)∆t +
∑z
j=1 σij
(
Wj(t) − Wj(t − ∆t)
)
] > 0, then at the
start of stage t + ∆t, the sum of his investments on the whole range of n business
sectors, {pik,i(t+ ∆t), i = 1, · · · , n} should equal his total wealth available at the end
of stage t:
n∑
i=1
pik,i(t+ ∆t) = Xk(t) + [k(t) + rXk(t)− ck(t)]∆t
+
n∑
i=1
pik,i(t)[bi(t) +
z∑
j=1
σij
(
Wj(t)−Wj(t−∆t)
)
], 3
(4.11)
if the kth order household’s net wealth is non-positive at the end of stage t, Xk(t)+
[k(t) + rXk(t)− ck(t)]∆t+
∑n
i=1 pik,i(t)[bi(t)∆t+
∑z
j=1 σij
(
Wj(t)−Wj(t−∆t)
)
] ≤ 0,
then he cannot participate investing on anyone of business sectors:
pik,i(t+ ∆t) = 0, i =, 1, 2, · · · , n. (4.12)
where Pi(t) and Xk(t) can be recursively solved out according to Eq. (4.2) and
Eq. (4.4) respectively,
Pi(t+ ∆t) = Pi(t)[1 + bi(t)∆t+
z∑
j=1
σij
(
Wj(t+ ∆t)−Wj(t)], Pi(0) = Fi(0)
ni,F
(4.13)
Xk(t+ ∆t) = Xk(t) + [k(t) + rXk(t)− ck(t)]∆t+ pik(t)′[b(t)∆t+ σ
(
W (t+ ∆t)−W (t))],
(4.14)
with the initial conditions that Xk(0) =
∑n
i=1 Fi(0)/K, k(0) = 0, bi(0) = 0, pik,i(0) =
Fi(0)/K, pik(0)
′ = (pik,1(0), · · · , pik,i(0), · · · , pik,n(0)). The investment portfolio of each
household’s stands on the same starting line, the capitalised value of the whole busi-
ness sectors, equally belong to each household at the initial condition of the dynasty.
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4.2.2.1 Economic system with general investment strategy
This chapter is to investigate the evolution of wealth inequality under an economic
system where households make investment decisions at each time stage following
General Strategies (GS) in a completed market. The GS satisfies:
{pik,i(t)} =

pi1,1(t) · · · pik,1(t) · · · piK,1(t)
...
. . .
...
pi1,i(t) pik,i(t) piK,i(t)
...
. . .
...
pi1,n(t) · · · pik,n(t) · · · σK,n(t)

n×K
(4.15)
Be consistent to Eq. (4.10), the sum of each GS’s elements in row meets
K∑
k=1
pik,i(t) = ni,FPi(t−∆t), (4.16)
it presents the sum of all household’s investments at just start of time t equal to the
capitalized value of the ith business sector at just end of time t−∆t, namely its unit
stock price Pi(t−∆t) multiplying the time-invariant number of stocks ni,F .
Be consistent to Eq. (4.11), the sum of each GS’s elements in column satisfies
n∑
i=1
pik,i(t) = Xk(t−∆t) + [k(t−∆t) + rXk(t−∆t)− ck(t−∆t)]∆t
+
n∑
i=1
pik,i(t− 1)[bi(t−∆t) +
z∑
j=1
σij
(
Wj(t−∆t)−Wj(t− 2∆t)
)
],
(4.17)
it presents the sum of the kth household’s investments on the full range of business
sectors at just start of time t, equal to his available wealth at the just end of time t−∆t.
His available wealth at end of t−∆t are constituted by the just start wealth at t−∆t,
Xk(t−∆t) plus his after-consumption saving [k(t−∆t)+rXk(t−∆t)−ck(t−∆t)]∆t,
then plus his financial capital again during t −∆t, by investing on business sectors,∑n
i=1 pik,i(t−∆t)[bi(t−∆t) +
∑z
j=1 σij
(
Wj(t−∆t)−Wj(t− 2∆t)
)
].
Further more, this household’s labor income level and financial capital gain level at
t−∆t, k(t−∆t) and bi(t−∆t) respectively follow Eq. (4.6) and Eq. (4.9), namely,
k(t−∆t) ∆= T [Li(t−∆t, ·)− Li(t− 2∆t, ·)]
mi,L
(4.18)
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bi(t−∆t) ∆= T [Fi(t−∆t)− Fi(t− 2∆t)]
ni,FPi(t− 2∆t) (4.19)
where aggregated labor value and financial capital value Li and Fi are endogenously
driven by this business sector’s Total Factor Productivity (TFP), Ai,t and a few
other factors, these will be explained in Section (4.2.2.2). The analytical formulas to
compute Li and Fi at each time stage will be shown in Eq. (4.49) and Eq. (4.50)
later. Each business sector’s stock price Pi(t − 2∆t) can be computed following Eq.
(4.13) as that
Pi(t−2∆t) = Pi(t−3∆t)[1+bi(t−3∆t)∆t+
z∑
j=1
σij
(
Wj(t−2∆t)−Wj(t−3∆t)], (4.20)
subject to Eq. (4.19) and Eq. (4.20), it can be known that each business sector’s
earning rate of unit capital investment, bi and its stock price Pi can be recursively
iterated out, namely bi(t−∆t) is computed by the known Pi(t−3∆t) and bi(t−3∆t).
Moving back to the Eq. (4.17), the kthhousehold’s consumption ck(t − ∆t) is the
optimal consumption level obtained from the previous chapter, which is solved out
under general equilibrium framework. The specific solution of the ck(t) will be shown
later in Eq. (4.57) with the aggregated incomes from both labor income and capital
accumulation across the whole economy, Ek, Eq. (4.55) and Eq. (4.56).
Subject to the GS matrix, Eq. (4.15), it is a problem solving a few general strategies
chosen by household at the starting time of each stage t. It can be known that there
could be n × K − (n + K) + 1 groups of general strategies can be solved out for
each stage GS, with the n constraints Eq. (4.16) and the K constraints Eq. (4.17).
In addition, our target is to check the inequality evolution accompanying different
kind of factor changes, therefore, it had better to make expectation for the whole
n × K − (n + K) + 1 groups of general strategies, it means we find out the most
possible investment decision made by each household in the economy in expectation,
and their expected general strategies comprehensively leading the wealth inequality
evolution throughout the dynastic development.
In addition, be consistent to Eq. (4.14), the Xk(t −∆t) required by Eq. (4.17) can
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be computed by
Xk(t−∆t) = Xk(t− 2∆t) + [k(t− 2∆t) + rXk(t− 2∆t)− ck(t− 2∆t)]∆t
+pik(t− 2∆t)′[b(t− 2∆t)∆t+ σ
(
W (t−∆t)−W (t− 2∆t))], (4.21)
Thus, the Eq. (4.21), Eq. (4.17) and Eq. (4.15) together illustrate that the process
of each household’s wealth Xk and their general investment strategies pik,i(t) can be
recursively simulated out step by step.
4.2.2.2 Endogenous Labor income and Financial Capital
Subject to the Solow-Swan model with human capital improved by Mankiw et al.
(1992) that
Yi,t = F
α
i,tH
β
i,t
(
Ai,tLi,t
)1−α−β
(4.22)
where Yt is the business sector’s output at stage t (hereafter, omit i for all of param-
eters), Ft is physical capital (financial capital), Ht is human capital, At stands for
technique level (Total Factor Productivity, TFP among business sectors), Lt is labor
and α and β respectively are the elasticity of output with respect to physical capital
and labor. Subject to Eq. (4.22)
ln
(
Yt/Yt−1
)
=α ln
(
Ft/Ft−1
)
+ β ln
(
Ht/Ht−1
)
+
(
1− α− β) ln (At/At−1)+ (1− α− β) ln (Lt/Lt−1) (4.23)
with an implicit assumption that the sector’s TFP progresses uniformly through each
stage E ln
(
At+1/At
)
= E ln
(
At/At−1
)
. Reordering Eq. (4.23) to be
ln
(
At/At−1
)
=
ln
(
Yt/Yt−1
)
1− α− β − ln
(
Lt/Lt−1
)
− α
1− α− β ln
(
Ft/Ft−1
)− β
1− α− β ln
(
Ht/Ht−1
) (4.24)
after release the implicit assumption, by adding a noise term
ln
(
At
)
= ln
(
At−1
)
+
ln
(
Yt−1/Yt−2
)
1− α− β +
1
2
σ2 − 1
2
σ2 − ln (Lt/Lt−1)
− α
1− α− β ln
(
Ft/Ft−1
)− β
1− α− β ln
(
Ht/Ht−1
)
+ σZt
(4.25)
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Subject to Eq. (4.25), the dynamics of TFP can be presented by
dAt
At
=
[
µt − lt − (ωt + dt − r)− δt
]
dt+ σdZt (4.26)
with
µt
∆
=
ln
(
Yt−1/Yt−2
)
1−α−β − 12σ2 (4.27)
lt
∆
= ln
(
Lt−1/Lt−2
)
(4.28)
ωt + dt − r ∆= α1−α−β ln
(
Ft−1/Ft−2
)
(4.29)
δt
∆
= β
1−α−β ln
(
Ht−1/Ht−2
)
(4.30)
where σdZ1 is innovation risk of TFP dynamics, Z is Brownian motion. The drift
component of TFP dynamics is linearly composited by the changes of endowment
structure, µt, lt, wt + dt − r and δt respectively correspond to the changes of output,
labor, capital and human capital. wt and dt separately imply the proportion of At
dynamics attributed by equity-financing and debt-financing.
Intuitively, Eq.(4.24) exposits TFP At as the driver to create residual profit de-
ducting physical capital, labor and human capital from output, for each business
sector during producing. A few studies represented by Griliches (1979) clarifies the
TFP At evolution associated to technological research and development risk (R&D),
expressed by the diffusion term σdZt of the Eq. (4.24). On the other hand, some
studies represented by Lin (2011) finds developing economies may have a latecomer
advantage in productive technology, because their technology has not achieved the
global technological frontier. Thereby the latecomer advantage benefits the business
sectors in emerging nations almost shouldering minor R&D risk than that of na-
tions whose industrial sectors on the global technological frontier. Accordingly, the
Eq.(4.26) can be treated equivalently as the business sector’s profitability dynamics
of Developing Economies, comparing with Eq. (4.24), the R&D risk can be neglected,
the business sector’s profitability (or TFP) AD could be much stable and smoothy
than the profitability on technological frontier, and satisfies
dADt = (µt + r − lt − ωt − dt − δt)ADt dt, (4.31)
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In addition, an theoretical background should be existing in this research that, the
markets among among economies are open no trade barrier between developed and
developing countries, the industrial location (division) of each kind of business sector
is freely determined by the competitive equilibrium for the open trade, similar as the
explanation by Hertel (1997) .
Subject to Eq. (4.26) and Eq. (4.31), conventional economic analysis expresses
the expected gross salary rate (wage rate and labor welfare) according to
[lt + k(µt + r − lt − ωt − dt − δt)]dt. (4.32)
However, Eq. (4.32) ignores the reserved part of residual profit under a budget
management policy for the incremental activities of the business sector, such as a
forthcoming project. Therefore, being consistent with the budget management, the
gross salary (or financial capital gain)4 available at each time stage, ϕ(t, ·) should
be treated as the difference between the adjacent contingent claims adaptive to the
prospect of the sector development
ϕt+1 = Vt+1 − Vt, (4.33)
Vt = Et
∫ T
t
Ht,τGτdτ +Ht,TVT , (4.34)
the G is the continuously periodical payment flow expected to be attributed to ei-
ther the labor force or financial capital suppliers, conditional on the business sector
progress adaptive to each time sage t. In the conventional economic aspect, under
the single closed economy, the retaining profit and the periodical payment attributed
to labor force or financial capital suppliers is linear relationship in simplicity, denoted
by
G(A, t) = ξ(·)A (4.35)
where, ξ is the linear adaptor.
Moreover, between the bilateral economies with open trade condition, under the
4When ϕ(t, ·) corresponds the business sector’s gross salary at each period, it could be denoted
by Lt, alternatively when ϕ(t, ·) corresponds financial capital gains (no matter direct financing or
indirect financing, it could be denoted by Ft .
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competitive equilibrium between the identical industrial sector in developed econ-
omy (technological frontier) and developing economy (own latecomer advantage in
producing technology), the periodical payment attributed to labor force or financial
capitals suppliers should be linear to the differential level of technology of the identical
business sector:
G(A,AD, t) = ξ1(·)A+ ξ2(·)AD (4.36)
where ξ1 and ξ2 are the linear adaptors respective for A and A
D. However, the
emerging economic perspective from new economic thinking begin regarding its could
be nonlinear between them, also the attribution relationship for the value added of
each business sector to its labor and financial capital suppliers could be endogenously
driven by relative difference between the technology in developed economy and the
in developing economy, A
D
A
:
G(A,AD, t) = ξ1(AD
A
, ·)A+ ξ2(AD
A
, ·)AD + Ω(A,AD, t) (4.37)
where Ω
(
A,AD, t
)
is the nonlinear component, its architecture is still unsure and it
will be solved out in the end of derivation as shown as Eq. (4.49) and Eq. (4.50).
Lets calling back Eq. (4.33), subject to the nonlinearity in Eq. (4.37), the adaptive
payoff Vt should be endogenously driven by A, AD and t in nonlinearity. Moreover Ht,τ
is the time discounter5. The Ht,TVT presents the terminal payment by the business
sector to its stakeholders, for labor force, it is the dismissal compensation fee for
employment, on the other side for financial capital suppliers, it is the asset collateral
priority for loan lenders and then residuals for shareholders. The Vt is the expected
payoff accumulative from t to T conditional on each development stage t by this
business sector, equivalently, Vt can be treated as the expected total outputs from t
to T by this business sector, and nothing left at the end of liquidation stage.
Similar to employee payment, investor payment also satisfies Eq. (4.33) and Eq.
(4.34). We use Lt and Ft to express Vt respectively for the labor and capital for the
5Following Eq. (3.2), the state price density at τ conditional to t, τ < c < t < T , can be written
as Ht,τ = e
−[r(τ−t)+
∫ τ
t
θ(c)′dW (c)+ 12
∫ τ
t
‖θ(c)‖2dc]
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business sector at t.
Under the competitive equilibrium among open economies, each specific business
sector’s salary and capital payoff should be variant upon on time stage, technological
frontier TFP At and latecomer advantage TFP A
D, namely V(t, A,AD), for simplicity
written as Vt, subject to Eq. (4.26) and Eq. (4.31) applying Ito’s formula on H0,τV
yields
dH0,tVτ = −H0,t[rdt+ θ(t)′dW (t)]Vτ +H0,t {(µ+ r − l − ω − d− δ)
·AD ∂Vτ
∂AD
dt+ (µ+ r − l − ω − d)A∂Vτ
∂A
dt+
1
2
σ2A2
∂2Vτ
∂A2
dt
+A
∂Vτ
∂A
σdZ } .
(4.38)
Integrating on both sides with the conditional expectation up to t
Et[H0VT − Vτ ] = −rEt
∫ T
t
H0,τVτdτ + Et
∫ T
t
H0,τ (µ+ r − l − ω − d− δ)AD ∂Vτ
∂AD
+Et
∫ T
t
H0,τ
[
(µ+ r − l − ω − d)A∂Vτ
∂A
+
1
2
σ2A2
∂2Vτ
∂S2
]
dτ,
(4.39)
and plugging Eq. (4.34) into Eq. (4.39), the below PDE can be obtained
0 = −rVτ + (µ+ r − l − ω − d)A∂Vτ
∂A
+
1
2
σ2A2
∂2Vτ
∂A2
+(µ+ r − l − ω − d− δ)AD ∂Vτ
∂AD
+ G.
(4.40)
The Vτ can be assumed as homogenous of degree one in A and AD, the solution could
be structured as V = ADQ(x), where x is a nonlinear adapter between the business
sector’s value attributable to labor (or financial capital supplier) and the sector’s
residual profitability contributed by the latecomer productive advantage in emerging
economy, namely xAD = A. Comparing with Eq. (4.32), the Q(x) is dynamical frac-
tion of the aggregated payments occupied in AD. Q(x) involves the paying change
term attributed by the differential prospects adaptive to the adjacent time stages.
Substituting V = ADQ(x) and the relevant derivatives ∂V/∂AD = Q, ∂V/∂A =
∂Q/∂x and ∂2V/∂A2 = (AD)−1∂2Q/∂x2 into (4.40), the below ODE can be obtained
(µ− l − ω − δ)Q+ (δ + d)x∂Q
∂x
+
1
2
σ2x2
∂2Q
∂x2
+ θx = 0, (4.41)
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for the employees’ gross salary case, existing θ = l + kAD/A contains the linearity
percentage of both basic salary and welfare benefit on the entity value. In respect to
the business sector’s investor side, existing θ = d + ω is the linearity proportion of
the payment to them. Conjecturing the specific form of Q(x) in (4.41) as
Q(x) =
θx
l + ω + kA
Q(t)
A
+ d− µ
+B1x
y1 +B2x
y2 (4.42)
where the fraction is the linear component of the Q(x). It indicates the linear part of
the payments to employees or investors occupied in the whole payment flows of the
entity. The B1x
y1 and B2x
y2 are the curvature parts of the Q(x), they correspond the
nonlinear various parts of payments inferenced by the contingent prospects. y1 and
y2 are the real root pair follow the quadratic equation
1
2
σ2y(y − 1) + (δ + d)y + (µ− l − ω − µ) = 0 (4.43)
imposing the condition that the rigid paying (basic salary and equity withdraw)
proportion µ <
(δ+d− 1
2
σ2)2
2σ2
+ l+ ω + δ to ensure existence of two real roots. Then the
roots can be sorted as
(
y1
y2
)
=
(1
2
σ2 − δ − d)±
√
(δ + d− 1
2
σ2)2 + 2σ2(l + ω + δ − µ)
σ2
(4.44)
In order to solve out the specific form of B1 and B2 in Eq.(4.42), two boundary con-
ditions are required. One boundary condition is that the labor requirement converges
to zero at the end of development T , accompanying the TFP AT progress to be very
high. This tendency is consistent with that explained by Mankiw et al. (1992) Jones
(1995), the TFP (aggregated labour productivity) growth is driven by human capi-
tal accumulation, accompanying the share of human capital participating larger and
larger share in economic growth, then the intensity of labor and physical capital tend
to shrink. The physical (financial) capital relative to technique reaches an upper limit
D at T :
QL,T (xT ) = LT (AT , A
D
T )/A
D
T = 0
QF,T (xT ) = FT (AT , A
D
T )/A
D
T = D
(4.45)
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the subscript L and F of Q respectively identifies that they correspond to VLt or VFt ,
because in previously, we simply denoted both VLt and VFt sharing the homogenous
form as V(t, At).
On the other side, at the just start stage t0 of economic development, the intensity
of labor initiates from the whole, there is no R&D component involved in TFP, then
there is no technological risk at start stage, xt0 = At0/A
D
t0
= 1. At just starting t0,
there is no demand for labor and capital, namely Lt0 = 0 and Ft0 = 0. Thereby, the
incremental Q′L,t0 and Q
′
F,t0
stand for the actual requirements for labor and capital
at the just end of t0. By considering the labor welfare has not yet been given, then
it existing
QL,t0(xt0 = 1) = (1 + k)Q
′
L,t0
(xt0 = 1)− k
QF,t0(xt0 = 1) = (1 + k)Q
′
F,t0
(xt0 = 1)
(4.46)
based on the two boundaries of the Eq. (4.45) and Eq. (4.46), the simultaneous
equations sets can be respectively established:
l+k
AD(t)
A
l+k
AD(t)
A
+d+ω−µ
D +B1,L ·Dy1 +B2,L ·Dy2 = 0
B1,L +B2,L = k
[
l+k
AD(t)
A
l+k
AD(t)
A
+d+ω−µ
+ y1B1,L + y2B2,L − 1
] (4.47)
and 
ω+d
l+k
AD(t)
A
+d+ω−µ
D +B1,F ·Dy1 +B2,F ·Dy2 = D
B1,F +B2,F = k
[
ω+d
l+k
AD(t)
A
+d+ω−µ
+ y1B1,F + y2B2,F
] (4.48)
where B1,L and B2,L, B1,F and B2,F separately correspond to the coefficients B1, B2 of
QL and QF . Their specific forms can be solved out from the simultaneous equations,
Eq. (4.47) and Eq. (4.48). After that plugging them back into Eq. (4.42), based on
the homogeneous expression V = ADQ(x), the analytical solutions of the endogenous
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labor and financial capital Lt(At, ·), Ft(At, ·) at t satisfy
Lt(At, ·) = lAt + kA
D
t
l + ω + k
ADt
At
+ d− µ
−{
k(ω + d− µ)Dy2−y1 + [y2(1 + k)− 1][l + kA
D
t (t)
At
]D1−y1
}
ADt (t)
1−y1Ay1t
(l + ω + k
ADt (t)
At
+ d− µ) {y2(1 + k)− 1−Dy2−y1 [y1(1 + k)− 1]}
+
{
k(ω + d− µ) + [y1(1 + k)− 1](l + kA
D
t (t)
At
)D1−y1
}
ADt (t)
1−y2Ay2t
(l + ω + k
ADt (t)
At
+ d− µ) {y2(1 + k)− 1−Dy2−y1 [y1(1 + k)− 1]}
,
(4.49)
Ft(At, ·) = (ω + d)At
l + ω + k
ADt
At
+ d− µ
+{
k(ω + d)Dy2−y1 + [y2(1 + k)− 1](l + kA
D
t (t)
At
− µ)D1−y1
}
ADt (t)
1−y1Ay1t
(l + ω + k
ADt (t)
At
+ d− µ) {y2(1 + k)− 1−Dy2−y1 [y1(1 + k)− 1]}
−
{
k(ω + d) + [y1(1 + k)− 1](l + kA
D
t (t)
At
− µ)D1−y1
}
ADt (t)
1−y2Ay2t
(l + ω + k
ADt (t)
At
+ d− µ) {y2(1 + k)− 1−Dy2−y1 [y1(1 + k)− 1]}
,
(4.50)
Subject to Eq. (4.27) ∼ (4.30), the solutions Eq. (4.49) and Eq. (4.50) release that
at stage t, each business sector’s demands on labor Lt and physical (financial) capital
Ft are endogenously driven by the technological progress At, the adaptively growth
rate of output and productive factors, ln
(
Yt−1/Yt−2
)
, ln
(
Lt−1/Lt−2
)
, ln
(
Ft−1/Ft−2
)
and ln
(
Ht−1/Ht−2
)
, the labor welfare k and the technical innovation risk σ.
4.2.3 Optimal consumption with financial investment
Eq.(4.4) shows each household’s revenue contains the gross salary and financial capital
gain from different business sectors. Follows the optimal consumption level under
quadratic utility function, matching Eq. (4.4) with Eq. (3.16), gives
Ek(t, ·) = k(t) + pi′k(t)(b(t)− r1n), t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , T.6 (4.51)
6subject to k(0) = 0, bi(0) = 0, pik(0)
′ = (pik,1(0), · · · , pik,i(0), · · · , pik,n(0)) , pik,i(0) = Fi(0)/K ,
leads that Ek(0) = −r
∑n
i=1 Fi(0)
K
107
Originally, the aggregate revenue level of the whole economy is
E(t, ·) =
K∑
k=1
k(t, ·) +
K∑
k=1
pi′k(t)(b(t)− r1n) + r
K∑
k=1
Xk(t), t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , T, (4.52)
the assumption no individual saving for interest for (4.11) and (4.14) shows
n∑
i=1
pik,i(t) = Xk(t) (4.53)
substituting Eq. (4.53) into Eq. (4.52) yields
E(t, ·) =
K∑
k=1
k(t, ·) +
K∑
k=1
pi′k(t)b(t), t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , T, (4.54)
furthermore, based on K =
∑n
i=1 mi,L, Eq. (4.6), Eq. (4.9) and Eq. (4.10) results
E(0, ·) = 0 and Eq. (4.54) can be rewritten as
E(t, ·) =
n∑
i=1
mi,Lk(t, ·) +
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
pik,i(t)bi(t)
=
n∑
i=1
T [Li,t(At, ·)− Li,t−1(At−1, ·)] +
n∑
i=1
T [Fi,t(At, ·)− Fi,t−1(At, ·)]
= T
n∑
i=1
[Âi,t(At, ·)− Âi,t−1(At−1, ·)], t = 1, 2, · · · , T
(4.55)
where Âi,t(At, ·) = Li,t(At, ·) + Fi,t(At, ·), in respect to Eq. (4.49) and Eq. (4.50), it
can be presented as
Âi,t(At, ·) =
l + ω + kA
D(t)
A(t)
+ d
l + ω + kA
D(t)
A(t)
+ d− µ
Ai,t(At, ·)
+
µ {kDy2−y1 − [y2(1 + k)− 1]D1−y1}AD(t)1−y1A(t)y1
(l + ω + kA
D(t)
A(t)
+ d− µ) {y2(1 + k)− 1−Dy2−y1 [y1(1 + k)− 1]}
− µ {k − [y1(1 + k)− 1]D
1−y1}AD(t)1−y2A(t)y2
(l + ω + kA
D(t)
A(t)
+ d− µ) {y2(1 + k)− 1−Dy2−y1 [y1(1 + k)− 1]}
(4.56)
Along each stage of economic development, heterogenous households’ optimal con-
sumptions satisfy the result we obtained in the last chapter, Eq. (3.34), which max-
imizing the social welfare ( household’s consumptions) and their heritage wealth at
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the end of dynasty, recalling Eq. (3.34) that
c∗k(t) =
1
γk
− Γ− E(t, ·)
γkE
{∫ T
0
[Γ− E(t, ·)]2dt
}E{∫ T
0
[Γ− E(t, ·)][1− γkk(t)
+γkpi
′
k(t)(b(t)− r1n)]dt} − GkXk(0)
[Γ− E(0, ·)][Γ− E(t, ·)]
E
{∫ T
0
[Γ− E(t, ·)]2dt
} (4.57)
In this chapter, household’s revenue has been endogenously given by Eq. (4.55) and
Eq. (4.56). At each stage, the optimal consumption level c∗k(t) will be substituted
to the Eq. (4.11), recursively yielding the solution of household’s investment weight
{pik,i(t+ 1)} rebalancing to the next stage. After that, it permits recursively solving
out the trajectories of households’ net wealth along the whole dynasty and investi-
gating the key determinants embedded in the endogenous revenue flow impacting on
inequality.
4.3 Simulation and Analysis
In this simulation, we attempt to investigate whether changes of productive factors
and structures can influence wealth inequality or not, such as the changes of sector’s
output, labor, financial capital, human capital, the capital structure (between equity
and debt-financing fraction), worker’s welfare from residual profit. Moreover, the cap-
ital gain has been regarded as one of income sources for household’s saving, which is
endogenously generated by the operating business sector to contribute output. Under
this circumstance that labor and investment earning are endogenously generated, it
is worthy to re-check if the homogenous risk averse in household’s consumption can
determine the wealth inequality or not.
The analytical solutions have been obtained. However the simulation load is
still astonished attributed by the endogenous structures for both revenue resources
and heterogenous consumption among households. In specific revenue resources con-
tains the labor income distributed by their affiliated sector and the capital gain from
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their investment in kinds of sectors. Each business sector makes differently partic-
ular decision in allocating the wage and capital financing return to their labor and
capital-supplier, at each stage. Simultaneously each household’s investment decision
is endogenously driven by their differing consumptions at each stage. Moreover each
household’s optimal consumption level is adjusted by their revenue status. These
endogenous structures are dynamically and recursively carried on, stage by stage
throughout the whole dynasty.
Fortunately, the high performance computing7 can realise this simulation experi-
ment.
In respect to the fixed parameter adopted in the simulation, they are shown in Ta-
ble 4.1 and the parameter corresponds the potential determinants of wealth inequality,
is to be stated in Table 4.2:
Table 4.1: Summary of fixed parameters
Parameter Symbol Value
Household number K 30
Terminal stage T 80
Initial technique Ai,t0 1.1
riskless rate r 0.05
Upper limit of physical capital over technique at T D 6
Change of labor l 0.3
Technological progress volatility factor σ 0.05
Correlation between technique and product innovation ρ 0.1
Table 4.2: Potential determinants of wealth inequality
Parameter Symbol Value
debt-financing share of output ω 0.1
equity-financing share of output d [0.05: 0.35]
change of human capital δ 0.1
change of sector output µ 0.02
worker’s welfare in residual profit k 0.2
household’s risk aversion γ 0.25
7The simulations are achieved by employing Alibaba Cloud High Performance Computing Server.
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Figure 4.1: equity fraction vs. Gini coefficient along time
Figure 4.1 illustrates this model is capable to describe the inequality deteriorating
along time passing, this is consistent with the fact that the wealth keeps on con-
centrating. There is approximately “ smile ” relationship between equity-financing
fraction and the wealth inequality at each stage. This simulation suggests that the
share of equity-financing ωt is one determinant in wealth concentrating. The over-
loading or shortage of equity-financing could further accelerate the wealth inequality.
Table 4.3: Potential determinants of wealth inequality
Parameter Symbol Value
debt-financing share of output ω [0: 0.5]
equity-financing share of output d 0.2
change of human capital δ 0.1
change of sector output µ 0.02
labor’s welfare in residual profit k 0.2
household’s risk aversion γ 0.25
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Figure 4.2: debt-financing fraction vs. Gini coefficient along time
The Figure 4.2 illustrates the inequality of wealth could be negatively correlated
to the debt-financing share. Theoretically, in absence of thinking the efficiency of
equity/debt capital financing and financial market frictions, if the economy is more
bank-orientated, then the inequality of wealth expanses more fiercely.
Table 4.4: Potential determinants of wealth inequality
Parameter Symbol Value
debt-financing share of output ω 0.2
equity-financing share of output d 0.2
change of human capital δ 0.1
change of sector output µ [0 : 0.20]
worker’s welfare in residual profit k 0.2
household’s risk aversion γ 0.25
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Figure 4.3: Output changes vs. Gini coefficient along time
Figure 4.3 exposits that business sector’s output growth is seemly not a cause for
the expansion of wealth inequality, by controlling other factors or economic structures
as invariant.
Table 4.5: Potential determinants of wealth inequality
Parameter Symbol Value
debt-financing share of output ω 0.2
equity-financing share of output d 0.2
change of human capital δ 0.1
change of sector output µ 0.02
worker’s welfare in residual profit k [0.1:0.8]
household’s risk aversion γ 0.25
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Figure 4.4: labor welfare share vs. Gini coefficient along time
Figure 4.4 shows the labor welfare level in the business sectors could be negative
associated with wealth inequality. Intuitively, if the labor welfare level occupied an
larger proportion of the risk-adjusted retained profit. If their retained earnings have
a great difference among business sectors, then this leads the households who working
for the high-profitable sector obtaining comparatively higher welfare than those who
work for the low-profitability sector, amplifying their inequality of wealth. It can
be suggested that increasing the labor welfare cannot relieve the wealth inequality
but widen that. It may be not a reasonable approach to improve wealth inequality
by rising labor welfare. Alternatively, improving the secondary distribution through
fiscal aid or taxation system perhaps can be considered.
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Table 4.6: Potential determinants of wealth inequality
Parameter Symbol Value
debt-financing share of output ω 0.2
equity-financing share of output d 0.2
change of human capital δ [0.05:0.30]
change of sector output µ 0.02
worker’s welfare in residual profit k 0.2
household’s risk aversion γ 0.25
Figure 4.5: human capital vs. Gini coefficient along time
It shows that human capital accumulation insignificantly affects on inequality of
wealth.
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Table 4.7: Potential determinants of wealth inequality
Parameter Symbol Value
debt-financing share of output ω 0.2
equity-financing share of output d 0.2
change of human capital δ 0.1
change of sector output µ 0.02
worker’s welfare in residual profit k 0.2
household’s risk aversion γ [0.05:0.35]
Figure 4.6: risk-averse coefficient of consumption vs. Gini coefficient along time
Figure 4.6 demonstrates that under the optimal consumption level, Eq. (4.57), if
the homogenous risk aversion of consumptions is higher (less risk-averse), the wealth
inequality in the economy tends to be larger. It may be explained that under less
risk aversion, the richer prefers to consume more luxury good, however if they are
high-risk averse, then they will spend on luxury good and accumulate wealth faster
that other households. This illustration is opposite to the result shown in the previous
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chapter (Figure 3.7) that risk averse level in household’s consumption has no signif-
icant impacts on wealth inequality. The intrinsic reason why the simulated results
between two chapters are opposite, could caused by the household’s income source
has been switched from the exogenously given to the endogenous progressing from the
technological progress, productive factors and output growth. Intuitively, the higher
risk aversion coefficient (γ) in the quadratic form utility function, corresponds to that
households obtain higher utility at the same consumptions, corresponding less risk-
averse. Assuming all households are centralised to one fixed utility targeting level in
consumption, then the less γ benefits richer spend relatively less share of wealth to
maintain the averaging utility target, and so have more wealth left for saving. There-
fore, it leads to the wealth inequality deteriorating more fiercely when households are
less risk averse in consumption.
4.4 Conclusion and future studies
In this chapter, a complex economic system has been built, where satisfies the op-
timal consumption framework to an economic system with a completed financial
market where investor following general investment strategies, among the industrial
productions have distances to or on the global technological frontier, with industrial
allocation under competitive equilibrium. Household?s revenues is constituted by
both labour income and financial capital by allocating their saving to the range of
business sectors, adaptively during each development stages. Moreover, based on
the neoclassical economic growth developed by Mankiw et al. (1992), both financial
capital gains and labor income are endogenously driven by the technological progress
(TFP) of each business sectors, the growth rate of output, productive factors and
human capital. At each development stage, the attributions of labor income and
financial capital gain follows the contingent claim analysis. The simulated analysis
in the Chapter 4 illustrates that the evolution of wealth inequality is endogenously
driven by the financial structure (equity financing vs. debt financing), labor force’s
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welfare level and household’s risk aversion in consumption, conversely the output
and human capital accumulation illustrate no significant effects on wealth inequality.
Moreover, the whole sets of simulations, indicating wealth in- equality issues should
be more and more fierce, accompanying economic development throughout the whole
dynasty. If we believe the technological progress promotes the economic growth, then
it can be suggested technological progress could be one of intrinsic cause raising in-
equality.
In respond to the robustness of the results suggested in this chapter, prospectively
for each simulation from under Table 4.3 to Table 4.6, beside the incremental interval
of varying economic variable, such as the change rate of sector output in Table 4.4,
the other economic parameters have also segmentally been adjusted, to see whether
the observed result could be sensitive to the freezing parameters or not. Our finding
is that the mainstream has not been influenced. However, it should be highlighted,
the historical parameters require to be calibrated inside the economic complexity in
the future work.
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Appendix A
Estimation of decomposed
volatility
The observable price of stock S(t), index IN(t) and market M(t) respectively satisfy
dS(t)
S(t)
= µdt+ σsdZs(t) (A.1)
dIN(t)
IN(t)
= µINdt+ σINdZIN(t) (A.2)
dM(t)
M(t)
= µMdt+ σMdZ3(t) (A.3)
where µ, µIN and µM are the drift rate of each process. σs, σIN and σM are the volatil-
ity factor corresponding to the dynamics of S(t), IN(t) and M(t). Zs(t), ZIN(t) and
Z3(t) are the Brownian motions.
In section 2.1, the stock retrun volatility is decomposed into three components re-
spectively attributed by the firm, index and market level information. Therefore,
the diffusion σsdZs(t) of stock price dynamic can be split to be three independent
diffusions as
dS(t)
S(t)
= µdt+ σfdZ1(t) + σindZ2(t) + σMdZ3(t) (A.4)
where σfdZ1(t) is the endogenous diffusion driven by the firm level information,
σindZ2(t) and σMdZ3(t) are the exogenous diffusions driven by the index and market
level information. Following the similar procedure, splitting index volatility into two
parts driven by index and market level information. Thus the diffusion σINdZIN(t)
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can be split to be two as
dIN(t)
IN(t)
= µINdt+ σindZ2(t) + σMdZ3(t) (A.5)
where σindZ2(t) and σMdZ3(t) motivated by the endogenous information from index
and exogenous information from market level respectively.
If subtract (A.1) from (A.4) and (A.2) from (A.5) and write the result in a discrete
form, it gives
σsZs(t)
√
∆t = σfZ1(t)
√
∆t+ σinZ2(t)
√
∆t+ σMZ3(t)
√
∆t (A.6)
σINZIN(t)
√
∆t = σinZ2(t)
√
∆t+ σMZ3(t)
√
∆t (A.7)
Taking variance on (A.6) and ( A.7) give
Var(σsZs(t)
√
∆t) = Var(σfZ1(t)
√
∆t) + Var(σinZ2(t)
√
∆t)
+Var(σMZ3(t)
√
∆t) + 2σfσinCov(Z1(t)Z2(t)
√
∆t)
+2σinσMCov(Z2(t)Z3(t)
√
∆t) + 2σfσMCov(Z1(t)Z3(t)
√
∆t)
(A.8)
Var(σINZIN(t)
√
∆t) = Var(σinZ2(t)
√
∆t) + Var(σMZ3(t)
√
∆t)
+2σinσMCov(Z2(t)Z3(t)
√
∆t)
(A.9)
The independent Brownian motions contributes their covariances are zero but Var(ZIN(t)) =
Var(Z2(t)) = Var(Z3(t)), then (A.8) and (A.9) can be rewritten to be
σ2s = σ
2
f + σ
2
in + σ
2
M (A.10)
σ2IN = σ
2
in + σ
2
M (A.11)
By taking variance on the discrete form of (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3), after reordering,
offers
σs =
√
N · Var(RS(t)) (A.12)
σIN =
√
N · Var(RIN(t)) (A.13)
σM =
√
N · Var(RM(t)) (A.14)
Subjected to (A.10), (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13), it yields
σf =
√
| σ2s − σ2IN | =
√
N · | Var(RS(t))− Var(RIN(t)) | (A.15)
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Subjected to (A.11), (A.13) and (A.14), it yields
σin =
√
| σ2IN − σ2M | =
√
N · | Var(RIN(t))− Var(RM(t)) | (A.16)
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Appendix B
Other historical parameter
estimation
ρi =
Cov(∆Zi(t)∆W(t))√
Var(∆Zi(t))Var(∆W (t))
, i = 1, 2, 3
∆Z1(t) =
RS(t)−RS −RIN(t) +RIN√
N · | Var(RS(t))− Var(RIN(t)) |
∆Z2(t) =
RIN(t)−RIN −RM(t) +RM√
N · | Var(RIN(t))− Var(RM(t)) |
∆Z3(t) =
RM(t)−RM√
N · Var(RM(t))
∆W (t) =
x(t+ 1)− x(t)−N−1k(θ̂(t)− x(t))√
N · Var(∆x(t))
(B.1)
Following maximized log-likelihood estimation, the converging speed k and cointegra-
tion equilibrium θ can be estimated by
k = −T ln

T
∑T−1
t=0 x(t)x(t+ 1)− (x(T )− x(0)) ·
∑T−1
t=0 x(t)−
(∑T−1
t=0 x(t)
)2
T
∑T−1
t=0 x
2(t)−
(∑T−1
t=0 x(t)
)2

(B.2)
θ =
n
1−m
m =
T
∑T−1
t=0 [x(t)x(t+ 1)]− [x(T )− x(0)]
∑T−1
t=0 x(t)− [
∑T−1
t=0 x(t)]
2
T
∑T−1
t=0 x
2(t)−
[∑T−1
t=0 x(t)
]2
n =
x(T )− x(0) +∑T−1t=0 x(t)−m∑N−1t=0 x(t)
T
(B.3)
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η =
√
2kδ2
1−m2
δ =
1
T
[
x2(T )− x2(0) + (1 +m2)
T−1∑
t=0
x2(t)− 2m
T−1∑
t=0
x(t)x(t+ 1)− Tn
] (B.4)
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Appendix C
Trading volume
Table C.1: Trading volume of stocks in Eurozone-US portfolio (In-Sample)
Stock Name Average daily volume(lead) Average daily volume(lag)
AEGON 12,220,541 951,200
Alcatel-lucent 31,637,984 19,144,920
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA 2,203,982 1,105,417
ArcelorMittal SA 9,315,133 6,074,824
Eni SpA 17,749,943 691,509
Fresenius Medical Care 789,666 174,543
Orange 9,328,530 1,061,169
RELX NV 4,089,247 213,449
Sanofi 3,202,636 2,571,929
SAP SE 3,869,732 1,664,125
STMicroelectronics NV 6,031,119 1,911,053
Telecom Italia S.p.A 82,464,466 358,539
Tenaris S.A 2,900,515 1,711,129
TOTAL S.A 6,045,863 3,013,808
Unilever 5,303,551 2,334,112
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Table C.2: Trading volume of stocks in UK-US portfolio (In-Sample)
Stock Name Average daily volume(lead) Average daily volume(lag)
ARM holdings plc 5,323,268 2,524,225
AstraZeneca plc 2,773,519 2,766,091
Barclays plc 50,227,723 3,452,195
BHP Billiton plc 8,589,135 1,321,290
BP plc 32,533,117 9,171,087
British American Tobacco plc 2,843,520 238,162
BT Group plc 18,745,776 265,420
Carnival plc 818,275 184,814
Diageo plc 4,281,529 581,543
GlaxoSmithKline plc 8,247,496 2,674,625
HSBC Holding plc 26,440,983 2,130,255
InterContinental Hotels Group 973,734 239,187
Lloyds Banking Group plc 159,523,022 3,160,685
National Grid plc 7,407,353 485,207
Pearson plc 2,376,736 338,290
Prudential plc 5,648,959 254,555
Randgold Resources Ltd 454,319 852,553
Rio Tinto plc 5,242,438 3,130,434
Royal Bank of Scotland Group 11,716,216 659,719
Royal Dutch Shell plc-A 3,976,278 2,623,036
Royal Dutch Shell plc-B 4,416,276 1,085,237
Shire plc 1,754,137 704,677
Smith&Newphew plc 2,465,972 300,293
Unilever plc 2,598,871 1,269,066
Vodafone Group plc 82,326,525 7,496,278
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Table C.3: Trading volume of stocks in China A-H share portfolio
Stock Name Average daily volume(lead) Average daily volume(lag)
Air China Ltd 38,352,809 14,600,094
Aluminum of China Co Ltd 64,612,605 25,735,846
Anhui Conch Cement Co Ltd 31,470,627 12,275,738
Bank of China Ltd 214,324,348 328,338,758
Bank of Communication Co Ltd 127,000,452 36,917,281
China CITIC Bank Co Ltd 60,126,805 45,196,555
China Eastern Airlines Co Ltd 46,710,415 13,334,904
China Life Insurance Co Ltd 26,603,850 39,392,931
China Merchants Bank Co Ltd 93,097,864 23,777,840
China Shenhua Energy Co Ltd 28,982,030 17,548,524
China Southern Airlines Co Ltd 66,072,075 18,907,438
Industrial&Commercial Bank 154,743,210 282,553,486
of China
Tsingtao Brewery Co Ltd 3,541,230 1,508,603
Zijin Ming Group Co Ltd 151,937,626 40,618,173
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Appendix D
Proof of existence of the constraint
1
Defining the individual’s accumulative consumptions adjusted by state-price density
from 0 to t as
J(t)
∆
=
∫ t
0
H0(τ)ck(τ)dτ. (D.1)
Also denoting the conditional expectation of the risk adjusted total consumptions
adaptive to the information F(t), as M(t)
M(t)
∆
= E
[∫ T
0
H0(τ)ck(τ)dτ | F(t)
]
, t ∈ [0, T ] . (D.2)
According to the martingale representation theorem, M(t) almost surely satisfies
M(t) = c+
∫ t
0
ϕ′(τ)dW (τ). (D.3)
Under F(t)-adaptive, the individual’s current prospect on the future accumulative
consumptions adjusted by state-price density Cf (t) satisfies:
Cf (t)
∆
=
1
Z0(t)
Et
[∫ T
t
H0(τ)ck(τ)dτ | F(t)
]
=
1
Z0(t)
[M(t)− J(t)] .
(D.4)
Additionally, applying Ito’s formula on Z(t)−1 subjected to Eq. (3.1), it has
dZ(t)−1 = ‖θ(t)‖2Z(t)−1dt+ Z(t)−1θ(t)′dW (t). (D.5)
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Based on Eq. (3.1), (D.1), (D.3) and (D.5), applying Ito’s formula on Cf (script t is
omitted) then yields
dCf = Z
−1 [dM − dJ ] + (M − J) d(Z−1) + [dM − dJ ] d(Z−1)
= Z−1
{
(ϕ′dW −H0ckdt) + (M − J + ϕ′dW −H0ckdt)(‖θ‖2dt+ θ′dW )
}
= Z−1H0 {−ckdt+H0 [ϕ′(θdt+ dW ) + (M − J)θ′(θdt+ dW )]} ,
(D.6)
with defining
H0[ϕ
′θ + (M − J)θ′θ] ∆= Ek(t, ·),
H0[ϕ
′ + (M − J)θ′] ∆= σ(t,Xk, ·),
(D.7)
then subjected to Eq. (3.2), the (D.6) can be rewritten as
dCf (t) = −e−rtck(t)dt+ e−rtEk(t, ·)dt+ e−rtσ(t,Xk, ·)dW (t). (D.8)
Writing Cf (t) in an integral form with the limit from 0 to T
Cf (T ) = Cf (0)−
∫ T
0
e−rtck(t)dt+
∫ T
0
e−rtEk(t, ·)dt
+
∫ T
0
e−rtσ(t,Xk, ·)dW (t),
(D.9)
substituting the Cf (0) subjected to integral form of (D.4) into (D.9). Moreover at the
life end, the individual’s prospect for her left consumption will be zero, Cf (T ) = 0,
then (D.9) can be arranged as
E
∫ T
0
H0(t)ck(t)dt =
∫ T
0
e−rtck(t)dt−
∫ T
0
e−rtEk(t, ·)dt
−
∫ T
0
e−rtσ(t,Xk, ·)dW (t).
(D.10)
By considering money time value, based on (3.16) the integral form of Xk(t) from 0
to T is
e−rTXk(T ) = Xk(0)−
∫ T
0
e−rtck(t)dt+
∫ T
0
e−rtEk(t, ·)dt
+
∫ T
0
e−rtσ(t,Xk, ·)dW (t),
(D.11)
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then (D.10) and (D.11) contribute
E
∫ T
0
H0(τ)ck(τ)dτ = Xk(0)− e−rTXck(T )., (D.12)
In addition, subjected to Eq. (3.2) it almost sure that
e−rTXk(T ) ≥ E [H0(T )Xk(T )] , (D.13)
lastly, (D.12) and (D.13) yields the constraint 1, Eq. (3.15).
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Appendix E
Proof for household’s wealth
framework
Recalling the risk deflator process, Eq. (3.1):
dZ(t) = −Z(t)θ(t)′dW (t) (E.1)
applying Ito’s formula on ln(Z(t)) yields:
Z(t) = e(−
∫ t
0 θ(τ)
′dW (τ)− 1
2
∫ t
0 ‖θ(τ)‖2dτ) (E.2)
then defining H0(t) as state-price density, contains both the discounted factor and
risk deflator:
H0(t) = e
−rtZ(t) = e−(rt+
∫ t
0 θ(τ)
′dW (τ)+ 1
2
∫ t
0 ‖θ(τ)‖2dτ) (E.3)
recalling the agent’s wealth process (4.4) with risk-neutral brownian motion W0 and
rearranging it with considering time discount factor to be integral form:
e−rtXk(t) = Xk(0) +
∫ t
(0,t)
e−rτ [k(τ)− ck(τ)] dτ +
∫ t
0
e−rτpi′(τ)σ(τ)dW0(τ) (E.4)
applying Ito’s formula on (Z(t)e−rtXk(t)) with (E.1) and (E.4):
d
(
Z(t)e−rtXk(t)
)
= Z(t)e−rt {[k(t)− ck(t)] dt+ pi′(t)σ(t)dW0(t)}
−e−rtXk(t)Z(t)θ′(t)dW (t)− Z(t)θ′(t)dW (t)
·{e−rt [k(t)− ck(t)] dt+ e−rtpi′(t)σ(t)dW0(t)}
(E.5)
assuming W (t) and W0(t) are independent and based on (E.3), rewriting (E.5) to be:
dH0(t)Xk(t) = H0(t) [k(t)− ck(t)] dt+H0(t)pi′kσ(t)dW0(t)
−H0(t)Xk(t)θ′(t)dW (t) (E.6)
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In addition, recalling the market risk vector, Eq. (4.5) that
θ(t) = σ(t)′(σ(t)σ(t)′)−1(b(t)− r1n). (E.7)
where Z(t) is to reconcile the price to be risk-neutral by releasing the market risk
premium. Additionally, the particular driving force of risk sources of each security
W (t) also can be reconciled to be risk-neutral W0(t) by the Girsanov’s theorem:
W0(t) = W (t) +
∫ t
0
θ(τ)dτ (E.8)
subject to the equation (E.7) and (E.8), reconverting the risk-neutral W0(t) in the
(E.6) back to W (t):
dH0(t)Xk(t) = H0(t) [k(t)− ck(t) + pi′(t)(b(t)− r1n)] dt
+H0(t)[σ
′(t)pi(t)−Xk(t)θ(t)]′dW (t)
(E.9)
Finally we obtain the present value of risk-neutral wealth of every household’s in an
integral form as:
H0(t)Xk(t) +
∫ t
0
H0(τ) [ck(τ)− k(τ)− pi′(t)(b(τ)− r1n)] dτ
=
∫ t
0
H0(τ)[σ
′(τ)pi(τ)−Xk(τ)θ(τ)]′dW (τ)
(E.10)
and
H0(T )Xk(T ) +
∫ T
0
H0(τ) [ck(τ)− k(τ)− pi′(t)(b(τ)− r1n)] dτ
=
∫ T
0
H0(τ)[σ
′(τ)pi(τ)−Xk(τ)θ(τ)]′dW (τ)
(E.11)
In addition, the aggregated wealth accumulated through the dynasty is
Gk = E(H0(T )Xk(T ))−Xk(0)+ (E.12)
(E.11) and (E.12) together give
Gk +Xk(0)+ + Et
[∫ T
t
H0(s) [ck(s)− k(s)− pi′(t)(b(s)− r1n)] ds
]
= −
∫ t
0
H0(τ) [ck(τ)− k(τ)− pi′(t)(b(τ)− r1n)] dτ
(E.13)
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In the end, by taking conditional expectation and denoting the generalized income Ek
contains both labor income k and expected the capital gain vector pi
′(t)(b(τ)− r1n)
(zero in the no financial investment scenario), then subject to (E.10) and (E.13), the
generalized expression of each household’s wealth is
Xk(t) =
1
H0(t)
{
Et
[∫ T
t
H0(s) [ck(s)− Ek(s))] ds
]
+Xk(0)
+ + Gk
}
(E.14)
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